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Public Policy and Private Initiative: 
Railway Building in Sao Paulo 1860-1889 
Introduction 
This study informs several inter-related currents in the literature about the 
history of Brazilian development. Much recent writing, concerned primarily 
with structural change in the post-Second World War period, has focused on the 
role of state capital, private national capital and foreign capital. Extending the 
earlier work of F. H. Cardoso and E. Faletto on dependency and development, 
P. Evans has examined collaboration and conflict among these three actors in 
an attempt both to define more exactly the process of dependent development 
and to assess the relative importance of each.1 Concerned mainly with the 
manufacturing sector, Evans asserted that there has been a tendency for state 
and foreign corporate capital to predominate at the expense of local private 
capital, notwithstanding an earlier symbiosis between state and private national 
capital or between transnational companies (TNCs) and local firms. Notably in 
the last few decades, an increasing homogeneity in the comportment of large-
scale state corporations and TNCs has denied operational space to the 
traditional, national entrepreneuriate which was associated with the historic 
process of industrialisation in more advanced economies. While Evans and 
others have written largely about the twentieth century, some historians 
working in Brazil - the 'Campinas school' - have added greater historical depth 
to Evans's approach by combining his analysis with an earlier hypothesis 
developed by A. Gerschenkron, namely the concept of Mate industrialisation'.2 
Examining the history of industrialisation in nineteenth century Europe, 
Gerschenkron posits that institutions - such as banks - played a larger role in 
promoting industrial expansion in late industrialising economies than in those 
that industrialised earlier. He also argues that in the most backward economies, 
the state, rather than private institutions, is likely to be the key institution. 
These traditions - represented by Evans and Gerschenkron - have been 
combined by the Campinas school to yield the theory of very late 
industrialisation, arguably most clearly articulated by J. M. Cardoso de Mello.3 
From the writing of authors associated with, or critical of, the Campinas 
school has emerged a growing body of research concerned to identify an early 
developmentalist tradition on the part of the Brazilian state (or to account for 
the lack or the failure of such a tradition) and a search for an authentic national 
industrial bourgeoisie capable of sustaining a process of development less 
directly dependent on government. Authors like Fritsch and Topik, echoing 
earlier studies such as those by Pelaez, have challenged conventional arguments 
that depict the administrations of the Old Republic, 1889-1930, as essentially 
non-interventionist. While differing in their assessments of the efficacy of and 
limits upon state action, they have hinted at continuity with earlier, pre-1889 
dirigiste traditions. More directly a product of debate within the Campinas 
school is the work of Cano, Z. M. Cardoso de Mello and, possibly, de Saes.4 
These authors have considered aspects of entrepreneurial formation and capital 
accumulation in Sao Paulo which contribute to a further evaluation of the action 
of the nineteenth century state. 
Renewed interest in the nineteenth century state compels an examination of 
government railway policy, an area where early developmentalist aspirations 
may be observed. There is a large bibliography on the railway history of Brazil 
but little - apart from pamphlets published during the period - explicitly about 
national government railway strategy. Even less has been written about 
provincial or state government policy. This is a critical gap in the literature, 
given that the shape of the railway network was largely established under the 
auspices of the relatively centralised system of administration that prevailed 
during the Empire and particularly from c. 1850 to 1889.5 Railways - financing 
construction, promoting incorporation and supervising operations - represented 
an area of early government activity in Brazil and throughout the continent. 
In considering a specific case-study, the paulista railway industry, this essay 
draws upon these recent contributions to the economic historiography of Brazil. 
The principal themes explored here will extend the general framework 
elaborated around the Campinas school by examining relations between 
government and national and foreign companies in the railways sector, by 
considering the distinct expectations and strategies of domestic and overseas 
capital and by assessing the structure of investment in the industry. The essay 
advances the discussion in two directions. First, by paying particular attention 
to the role of the local state. Secondly, by attempting a systematic analysis of 
the relative participation of local and foreign capital in the railways of Sao 
Paulo. 
Sao Paulo has a unique place in Latin American railway history. It was the 
only region of the continent where a large initial presence in the sector was 
sustained beyond the formative phase of railway development. Elsewhere in 
Brazil the situation was quite different, conforming to a pattern that was 
virtually continent-wide. The process of financing railways in most areas can 
be divided into a sequence of fairly precise phases. In the first instance 4local' 
capital was dominant. Investment came overwhelmingly from the export sector 
and the state. Landowners, merchants and government underwrote the 
construction of the first lines in virtually every country. Traders and 
agriculturalists did so with profits accumulated through the production and 
commercialisation of commodities in the world market. Governments acquired 
funds from taxation and overseas borrowing. A second phase, usually co-
terminus with the completion of the first wave of construction, was 
characterised by the dilution of domestic investment. Following the franchising 
of the first companies, pressures for additional building emerged from various 
quarters - provinces and sectors that had not benefited during the original round 
of construction - and from within the state itself. In most countries, starter lines 
demonstrated a substantial saving in costs over traditional means of 
communication provoking a demand for additional construction. Governments, 
in addition, became increasingly convinced of the strategic importance of 
railways. However, in most cases much of the second wave of construction was 
financed by direct foreign investment and/or a larger state presence rather than 
by increased domestic private provision. It is a matter of debate whether this 
was due to factors such as the inherently 'mercantile' mentality of early local 
shareholders, lack of domestic entrepreneurial competence given the scale of 
financial, technical and organisational effort required to sustain a massive 
public works programme, a conscious preference for investment in other 
activities or the growing integration of international capital markets. Other 
characteristics of this second phase - besides a dilution of local financial 
control - are probably pertinent, namely, greater sophistication of railway 
legislation and regulatory agencies, greater state access to external borrowing 
and the crystallisation of a positivist tradition. The third phase of the financial 
history of Latin American railway development was associated with the 
withdrawal of local private capital (and sometimes also state investment). 
Withdrawal was triggered by different events in particular cases but was usually 
cyclically determined. In some instances, domestic capitalists realised their 
investment at the peak of the trade cycle, selling to foreign consortia at 
moments of excess liquidity in the international system. In others, local 
companies that had raised part of their funds overseas (invariably in the form 
of debentures) fell into foreign hands during the trough of a depression when 
external mortgage bondholders foreclosed in cases of non-payment of interest. 
A similar fate often befell state lines financed by borrowing abroad or upon 
which the public debt was secured. Sao Paulo was exceptional in that the 
presence of local capital in the railway industry endured and increased 
throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, often in the face of the 
same circumstances that facilitated external penetration in other economies. An 
analysis of the factors that triggered and sustained investment in railways sheds 
light on paulista entrepreneurial capacity and performance. 
Various documents and printed reports generated by the provincial 
administration of Sao Paulo and railway company annual reports constitute the 
principal sources of this working paper. These are complemented by similar 
official material produced by the central government at Rio de Janeiro. 
Statements submitted by provincial presidents (governors) to the legislative 
assembly are an under-worked source: they contain a wealth of descriptive 
information about economic and political conditions. Similarly neglected are 
reports of debates in the provincial legislature. Legislative debates and 
Presidential Reports contain valuable details about the developmental 'project' 
of the period and, in the particular case of railways, point to distinct local and 
sectional aspirations. Annual reports presented by directors to meetings of 
shareholders and accounts of those meeting provide insights into the position 
of individual companies and into what may be described as 'corporate strategy'. 
These reports also contain much statistical material about railway operations 
and finance. Additional financial information was obtained from the provincial 
government agency and national inspectorate responsible for verifying share 
calls and capital investment and for determining the extent of government 
liabilities to companies under the terms of profit guarantee arrangements. 
Provincial and national archives also provided material about official railway 
policy. Some documents were available in printed form, reproduced either in 
company annual reports or in the yearly submissions of the relevant ministry 
to the national parliament. Some parallel series of British documents and 
reports were also consulted. 
The paper opens with a general description of Brazilian railway strategy. 
This is followed by an appraisal of the local dimension, various aspects of 
company policy and performance and the connection between railways and the 
coffee sector. The penultimate section discusses paulista business culture and 
considers the absolute and relative weight of local capital invested in railways. 
The appendix sets out this data and the methodology employed in its 
elaboration. 
A National Strategy for Railways 
Several factors influenced the evolution of railway policy in Rio de Janeiro. 
General, if ill-informed, economic aspiration applied throughout but political 
or strategic considerations were often to the fore. These naive expectations 
were invariably tempered by lack of finance, exacerbated by technical 
difficulties involved in railway building through the coastal escarpment. 
Tropical storms frequently destroyed partially completed construction work and 
large scale expenditure was required on tunnels, viaducts and rack sections. The 
contractor of the San Paulo (Brazilian) Railway Company Limited had to push 
the road bed from sea level to 2,625 feet in a rise of seven miles. Technical 
problems presented railway engineers in Brazil with enormous difficulties 
which involved massive expenditure on both construction and maintenance. But 
equally hazardous were the exaggerated expectations of government about the 
availability of finance and the profitability of railway operations. 
Three principal considerations influenced early programmes devised by the 
Imperial Government, namely, economic expansion, national integration and 
regional regeneration. Excessively optimistic, certainly during the period under 
consideration, the realisation of these objectives was frustrated by the size of 
the country and the consequent scale of construction necessary to translate 
policy into achievement. Policy implementation was also frustrated by an 
imperfect knowledge of the topography of up-country districts and false 
assumptions respecting the traffic-generating potential of many zones. The 
former often necessitated a succession of costly exploratory missions and 
frequent route changes; the latter made for an uneven momentum of building, 
failure to complete projects within stipulated times, shoddy construction, breaks 
of gauge and the generally poor financial performance of many companies. 
Procrastination by public officials responsible for the verification and 
inspection of railway projects was enhanced by the special pleading of 
individuals or sectional interest who. seized upon modifications to original 
routes for technical or topographical reasons in order to press for further route 
amendments that yielded particular profit. Whether technical or political in 
origin, delays and the reformation of concessions increased costs, discouraged 
would be investors - domestic and foreign - and in part explained the growing 
presence of the public sector as private interest faded. Nevertheless, despite 
such setbacks, these three principal over-lapping objectives established the 
parameters of national railway policy and continued to influence central 
government approaches to railway affairs even after the declaration of the 
Republic in 1889. To what extent were these objectives realised? 
Statements about the economic consequences of railway building and 
operation during the mid-nineteenth century rarely ventured beyond the general. 
As a substitute for mule trains, which handled the bulk of the commerce of the 
interior, railways were expected to provide a cheaper service and through 
speedier, more efficient handling of merchandise, were assumed to reduce 
losses due to spoilage or spillage of cargo. Lower freights would also permit 
the expansion of coffee cultivation above Rio, enabling fazencleiros to shift 
production from exhausted lands in the coastal foothills. Vague, universalist 
expectations that railways would stimulate agriculture, commerce and industry, 
and which dominate official publications of the period, have always been 
viewed with scepticism by historians. Traditional interpretations consistently 
emphasise the linkages between export-agriculture and early railway 
construction in Brazil, stressing the contributions of coffee producers to the 
flotation of the first major company, the Estrada de Ferro Dom Pedro II. 
National capital was attracted to this enterprise with the abolition of the 
trans-Atlantic slave trade, purchases of slaves having previously represented the 
principal investment of coffee producers after real estate. New writing, 
however, offers a somewhat more complex assessment, indicating the 
dominance of merchants, banks and the state itself amongst the EFDPII's 
shareholders.6 Recent scholarship also posits that railways facilitated not only 
the movement of the coffee frontier to the interior but that improvements in 
transport permitted the settlement of European immigrants who would raise 
cash crops for the local market upon land vacated by coffee. Previously the 
expansion of coffee cultivation at the expense of land devoted to basic food 
stables had occasioned a rise in the cost of living in urban areas provoking 
social unrest and government unease.7 Early railway projects embraced a 
diversity of economic objectives, the primacy of which may have changed over 
time. 
There is little evidence that railways directly stimulated heavy industry in 
Brazil during this period, notwithstanding a marked contribution to activity in 
the field of civil engineering and sanguine assumptions about the future for 
domestic iron and steel production. Brazilian policy makers were aware of 
circumstances overseas and perceived opportunities for the growth of iron 
production in the expansion of the railway industry. By the 1870s, when the 
Imperial Government began to assume a larger direct presence in railway 
management, there was an investigation of the possibility of shifting purchases 
of materials and equipment towards domestic producers, away from imports. 
Currency depreciation, recessions in the domestic iron industry following the 
end of the war with Paraguay in 1870, lobbying by the recently formed 
Associagao Industrial and resuscitation of the debate about the relative 
advantages of protection versus free trade may account for this initiative.8 The 
outcome was disappointing. Domestic output was high-cost due to the isolation 
of iron foundries, sited close to raw material supplies, and to the scale of 
production. Most firms were small, employing archaic technology and smelted 
with charcoal. The chemical properties of local materials were also not entirely 
suited to the manufacture of railway iron.9 The immediate potential for 
domestic supply was further constrained by the railway companies' substitution 
of steel for iron rails at this juncture. The switch to steel rails (iron track was 
usually re-laid on less densely trafficked branch lines) reduced demand for a 
product that could have been - and was experimentally - manufactured 
domestically for another that required substantial investment in new technology 
at the foundries. The rapid fall in the price of railway equipment and material 
in the world market after the mid-1870s hardly encouraged Brazilian railways 
to favour national products over imports. Locational factors, the physical 
properties of local raw materials, the structure of the domestic industry and the 
onset of the 'Great Depression' which dramatically reduced the cost of imports, 
coupled with a widening technology gap, frustrated the development of a 
railway supply industry in Brazil. 
The impact of railways upon commerce and the rural economy, more 
especially export agriculture in the coffee zone, was direct and conformed to 
contemporary expectations. Railways rapidly displaced traditional forms of 
transport, muleteers transferred their business to up-country districts serving 
zones devoid of rails or more usually linking the hinterland to railhead. The 
importance of the relocation of traditional means of transport to the interior as 
a mechanism securing the initial success of the early railway companies has 
probably been under-estimated in the literature. First, new opportunities up-
country for muleteers probably deflected some of their antagonism towards 
railways. Secondly, muleteers extended the catchment area of the railways and 
generated new business which filtered through to interior rail towns thereby 
sustaining the steady expansion of rail freight. Muletrains came to complement 
railways and may have stimulated economic activity in up-country districts in 
advance of railway extension. Thus, railways facilitated the steady expansion 
of coffee cultivation first along the Paraiba Valley and later in the planato. 
Between the late 1850s and late 1860s when Brazil's coffee exports fluctuated 
around an average of 163,560,475 kilos, the EFDPII in 1869 carried 94,231,838 
kilos out of a total of 147,258,271 kilos shipped by rail.10 Subsequently 
paulista railways carried an enormous tonnage of coffee and, though heavily 
dependent upon coffee traffic, also stimulated by the application of cheap tariffs 
the production of a range of agricultural commodities which were consumed in 
the expanding towns of the coffee zone." 
Aspirations of national integration were more explicitly articulated in early 
railway projects than vague expectations that construction would somehow 
promote commercial activity. That railways would unite the Empire was a 
cardinal tenet of transport policy which underpinned global transport strategy 
and found direct expression at the level of individual projects. A grand design 
for the improvement of communications was formulated as early as 1835. 
Decree 100 of that year authorised the franchising of one or more companies 
to construct a railway from the city of Rio de Janeiro to the provinces of Minas 
Gerais (the centre of which lay some 500 kilometres from the capital), to Rio 
Grande do Sul, approximately 4,500 kilometres south, and to Bahia, another 
coastal province situated some 5,500 kilometres north of Rio de Janeiro.12 
This grandiose scheme was later modified to provide a marginally less 
impracticable arrangement based upon an integrated system of railways and 
river navigation. Lines were to be pushed across the coastal plain, through the 
escarpment to connect with tributaries of the river Sao Francisco which would 
give access to the interior and facilitate communications amongst populated 
regions. Somewhat dismissive of the potential of coastal navigation, this 
strategy continued to dominate what might be termed imperial railway planning 
for much of the nineteenth century. 
Several companies incorporated during the 1850s were clearly conceived in 
terms of the grand design. The inauspicious Bahia and Sao Francisco Railway 
Company Limited, and the even more ostentatiously titled Recife and Sao 
Francisco Pernambuco Railway Company Limited, both registered in London, 
bear the stamp of this strategy. The definitive concessions of the EFDPII issued 
in 1855 explicitly stated that the company was to construct to Minas Gerais. A 
parallel concession issued by the government of the province of Rio de Janeiro 
encouraged the company to build to the frontiers with Minas and Sao Paulo.13 
These lines, along with the San Paulo (Brazilian) Railway Company Limited 
floated in the 1860s, were regarded as the bases of a national network. The 
companies enjoyed substantial government assistance - profit guarantees, loans 
and state purchases of shares when the money market was slack or private 
investors proved unwilling to subscribe to rights issues. There was also intense 
pressure from the Imperial Government during the 1860s and 1870s for these 
enterprises to pursue active building programmes. Inducements were offered to 
railway concessionaires to advance the inauguration of original lines, to extend 
main lines and to open branches. This stress on national integration as a 
cardinal objective of early railway policy is also reflected in the requirement 
imposed on all companies that they should conform to the same 5'3" (1.60m) 
gauge. 
Throughout the 1870s and 1880s a plethora of new concessions were 
designed to drive railheads into the interior, to connect regionally isolated 
networks and to promote the profitability of guaranteed charter companies. The 
Imperial Government deemed 4 ... the completion of the works of such 
importance ... ' that it was prepared to concede to the contractors of the San 
Paulo Railway a bounty of £50,000 per annum for each year that construction 
was finished ahead of schedule.14 And, well before the opening of the original 
SPR line, a survey of possible extensions was commissioned by Rio which 
ultimately served as the basic structure plan for major trunk routes in the 
interior of the province of Sao P a u l o . W h e n the Bahia and Pernambuco 
railway companies proved impervious to official exhortations to extend their 
respective main lines, an exasperated government assumed this charge. Private 
shareholders in the EFDPII had already been bought out when the original 
company displayed its inability to support an active programme of extensions. 
Official strategy was premised upon two inter-related objectives - (i) the 
formation of a national trunk railway connecting all major coastal provinces to 
the capital city and (ii) a series of pioneer lines designed to open up, and to 
secure central control of, the interior. Responsive to sectional economic 
interests and tempered by commercial considerations, the underlying thrust of 
the construction programme was essentially strategic. To this end subventions, 
bounties and all manner of financial inducements were offered to impresarios 
prepared to construct and operate railways. Foreign and domestic stockholders 
were cultivated and variously induced to develop concessions. Established 
companies were cajoled to conform with the grand strategy. And, in the final 
instance, if private capital was unwilling to construct, government would 
perforce act. An emphasis upon the strategic in imperial railway policy is 
hardly difficult to explain. The two decades between the promulgation of 
Brazil's first general railway concession in the 1830s and the successful 
incorporations of the 1850s, years that witnessed many abortive railway 
schemes, were a period of recrudescent secessionism when a number of 
outlying provinces displayed an intermittent attachment to republicanism and 
a desire for independence. A large drain on the Imperial Treasury, major revolts 
in Fernambuco and a weary campaign against localism in Rio Grande do Sul 
were but the more obvious manifestations of the potential for disintegration, 
and over-shadowed numerous minor revolts and disturbances. The need for 
vigilance against localism, and for defence of national unity continued to 
exercise the official mind throughout the third quarter of the nineteenth century, 
the heyday of the Empire and a period of remarkable economic expansion and 
political consensus. As in many slave societies, political turmoil was invariably 
viewed as likely to engender revolt on the plantations. Railways would secure 
not only the political integrity of the Empire, they would ensure stability and 
social order. 
The importance of the political in national railway strategy was probably 
heightened by the Paraguayan War and Brazil's territorial acquisitions 
following the defeat of Paraguay in 1870. Administrations at Rio were always 
sensitive to political events in the River Plate region and any process which 
appeared to threaten Brazilian ascendancy in Uruguay, an important outlet for 
the rural produce of distant, volatile and increasingly dynamic southern 
provinces. Montevideo provided facilities for the Brazilian naval squadron and 
afforded the most effective means of communicating with the inland province 
of Matto Grosso. The Paraguayan invasion of Matto Grosso, incursions into Rio 
Grande and logistical difficulties encountered during the war revealed the need 
for construction in the south.16 If the Paraguayan War had a direct impact 
upon national railway strategy it was in an enhancement of strategic 
considerations and a relative shift in the geographical distribution of new 
concessions away from the north-east and central coastal areas towards the 
south. In the 1870s the projection of lines 'to reach' Mato Grosso and Goias 
assumed a dimension comparable to that of 1850s schemes to construct 
'towards' Minas or the Sao Francisco. 
Such considerations outlived the Empire. To the chagrin of paulista interests, 
one of the first acts of the railway administration of the republic was the 
expropriation of the Sao Paulo-Rio de Janeiro Company. Registered in the city 
of Sao Paulo, the concern had been franchised by the province and financed by 
local capital. The company operated a metre gauge service to the frontier with 
the province of Rio de Janeiro where it connected with the national entity, the 
broad gauge EFDPII, soon to be renamed the Central Brazil Railway. Having 
obtained control of the paulista company, the national government proceeded 
to re-gauge the line thereby ensuring easier access to the province.17 Broad 
gauge connection with the Sao Paulo system was also perceived as a means of 
drawing to the federal capital part of the rapidly expanding trade of Santos. A 
decision influenced as much by fiscal and financial as by strategic 
considerations. At the time of the declaration of the republic Santos was poised 
to become the principal coffee port of Brazil. Declining coffee production in 
Rio, due to soil exhaustion, coupled with the rapid movement of the coffee 
frontier in Sao Paulo threatened to displace the pre-eminent role of Rio and 
undermine the profitability of that province's railways. The result was 
competition between railway networks focused upon the two ports for the 
carrying trade of up-country provinces, and attempts by Rio to syphon off 
coffee traffic from the 'north' of Sao Paulo. The coffee trade influenced not 
only the commercial viability of individual railways but had an impact, too, 
upon government finances. 
A combination of the commercial and the political may also be observed in 
policies devised to promote regional economic activity or to regenerate once 
prosperous but now stagnant provinces. If Brazil's early railway legislation 
grandly envisaged trunk lines emanating from the capital to distant northern and 
southern provinces, it is instructive that of the four companies that commenced 
operations in the 1850s, two were located in the sugar zone. Moreover, these 
same companies were two of the three London-registered Brazilian railways to 
benefit from gold guarantees. The Bahia line, located in the colonial sugar 
zone, and the Pernambuco company, operating in a region where cane 
cultivation was relatively new, were central to government strategy aimed at 
resolving the crisis in the sugar sector.18 Imperial railway policy, not least in 
terms of establishing a geographical balance in the allocation of concessions, 
was in part determined to placate powerful regional interests. If the 
over-ambitious 1835 project proposed overland construction to the north-east, 
lines actually built in the 1850s and 1860s were presented as cost-reducing 
innovations. These companies, subsequent state railway building and 
government guarantees on private capital invested in new railway companies 
and central sugar mills were devised to defend the place of Brazilian sugar in 
the world market.19 
By the 1870s the Imperial Government was acutely aware of the nature of 
the crisis in the sugar economy. A buoyant coffee sector had sucked slave 
labour from depressed sugar plantations which were already facing competition 
from Caribbean cane producers, in European markets where cane sugar was 
being displaced by home grown beet sugar. Hitherto Brazil had relied upon 
currency depreciation to undercut competitors. During the third quarter of the 
nineteenth century this option was impaired by the absorption of more efficient 
cane refining techniques elsewhere and by exchange stability (if not 
appreciation) resulting from the rapid growth of coffee exports. Given the 
over-representation of northern provinces in the Empire, it is hardly surprising 
that the central government acted to support the most important activity in the 
region. Various attempts to revitalise the regional economy culminated in 1873 
in the revision of the general statute which regulated the awarding of railway 
concessions, and, two years later, in enabling legislation which provided for 
profit guarantees on investment in central sugar mills.20 The September 1873 
railway act was the first major modification in twenty years and was framed to 
create an institutional environment conducive to the incorporation of private 
companies, especially concerns licensed by provincial administrations. If the 
following years witness a flurry of applications for guarantees for sugar 
railways and sugar mills, successful companies were few. 
Proposals of the 1870s to sustain the sugar sector echoed the euphoria of two 
decades earlier associated with the flotation of the Bahia and Pernambuco 
Companies which had attracted similar expectations and indeed the EFDPII, 
depicted as the catalyst of mineiro regeneration. Franchised as the line to Minas 
Geras and Sao Paulo in 1852, it was argued that the EFDPII would reactivate 
the mining sector in Minas and stimulate economic activity in the province 
generally through a reduction in transport costs. Lower freights would facilitate 
the shipment of ores and widen the market for metal products. More efficient, 
lower cost transport would also promote diversification into cash-crop 
agriculture, a process that should further reduce production costs in other 
sectors.21 In the province of Minas Gerais, railways would encourage intra-
sectoral growth and inter-sectoral integration. 
The public image of imperial railway policy was characterised by the large 
view of the locomotive and the iron road as innovations likely to modernise the 
Brazilian polity and economy. Backward and forward linkages would sustain 
existing agricultural and commercial activities and hasten an industrial 
transformation. Of equal if not greater utility, railways would secure the 
integrity of the state, consolidating communications between distant provinces. 
They offered the first effective means since the establishment of Portugese 
authority in Brazil of opening up the interior. Present in the preamble to initial 
railway concessions, these sentiments reached their apogee in the reformulation 
of railway legislation in the early 1870s, and found expression in the annual 
reports presented to Parliament by the Minister for Agriculture, Commerce and 
Public Works.22 Railways were an influence for economic and social 
improvement: the industrial age began with the railways. Only railways could 
fully meet the requirements of commerce and agriculture: they were a force for 
national unity and greatness. Consequently, aware that a small population and 
the weight of technical and commercial problems would initially inhibit private 
capital, the Imperial state was prepared to assume the onerous financial burden 
required to give effect to a project for national development based on railways. 
The elegance and regularity with which successive ministers pleaded the 
railway case before parliament was probably founded upon cruder calculations, 
notwithstanding the plausibility of the grand design. When considering 
applications for railway concessions during the 1830s and 1840s, uppermost 
amongst policy considerations was not the question of the nature of financial 
support required from the public purse by struggling companies, rather 
government assumed that railways would contribute directly to the exchequer. 
An early request for the grant of a concession in perpetuity was met with the 
opinion that after a specified period, railways should revert to the state.23 It 
was also considered that the companies might contribute a portion of their 
receipts to the treasury. The expectation that railways in Brazil were inherently 
profitable was current for much of the imperial period, despite the depressing 
evidence of companies' insatiable appetite for government guarantee payments, 
This may account for the tenacity with which the imperial administration 
claimed a right to participate in the net profits of the San Paulo Railway. Like 
other guaranteed lines, the SPR was obliged to reimburse the government when 
net receipts exceeded a specified limit. In the San Paulo case net earnings 
above 8% were to be divided equally between the company and the 
government. Having received a total of £518,443/15/10 from the Imperial 
Treasury by way of guarantee payments between inauguration and 1873, 
thereafter repayments commenced as income exceeded the 7% return on 
investment guaranteed the company under the terms of its concession. By 1887 
the guarantee debt had been extinguished. In that year £55,042/5/11 passed to 
the government.24 Some £132,907/13/1 was due to the government in 1888 
and £211,217/9/7 in 1889.25 
It is hardly surprising that the company wished to cancel the guarantee 
clauses of its concessions which stipulated that a portion of net receipts should 
be set aside for the exchequer. Nor was it remarkable that the government 
should decline to enter into guarantee abrogation negotiations with the railway. 
While by this time the allocation of 'excess profits' to guarantee repayment was 
well established elsewhere, the Imperial Government held that it participated 
as of right in net earnings above 8%. Sums received from the SPR under this 
head did not imply guarantee repayment. Ambiguity in the railway's 
concessions admitted this possibility, though earlier administrations had tended 
to accept these sums as guarantee repayment. Possibly Rio regarded its income 
from the San Paulo as a tax upon a prosperous province and one levied in a 
form least likely to draw paulista disapprobation directly upon the central 
government at a critical political juncture of mounting tension which found 
expression in Sao Paulo in pressure for states' rights and republicanism. 
Officials at the Ministry of Agriculture, Commerce and Public Works may have 
regarded payments by the SPR narrowly in terms of the general railway 
guarantee environment. In this context 'repayment' income from a prosperous 
coffee line must be set against the continuing dependence of other railways 
upon government guarantee payments and an inexorable pressure emanating 
from all quarters for state assistance to promote railways. By 1888 the total 
annual guarantee liability of the central government was 11.451:157$299 
paper.26 Twenty years earlier this figure had stood at a little more than 
3.000:000$000. By the end of the Empire the state was also responsible for an 
operating deficit on seven of ten government-owned lines nominally capitalised 
at over 80.000:000$000. Notwithstanding the enormous expansion of the state 
railway sector, there was at this time little criticism of feather bedding, a charge 
which would later be levied at the administration of the Central Railway in 
particular.27 Technocrats at the Ministry probably viewed state participation 
in the operating revenue of profitable, established guaranteed companies as a 
mechanism permitting the cross-subsidisation of new lines running a deficit. 
Thus the grand design of imperial railway strategy endured until the late 
1880s, its principal aims associated with laudable, if rarely realised, goals of 
national integration and progress. Occasionally such aspirations found 
expression in mundane expedients. 
Paulista Railway Policy: 
Provincial Ambitions and the National Interest 
The Sao Paulo railway network was inaugurated on 24 November 1860 when 
construction work started at Santos to build the line to Jundiai, located 86 miles 
away above the coastal escarpment. On 16 February 1867 the San Paulo 
Railway was provisionally opened throughout. Santos was the principal port of 
the province and Jundiai a medium-sized industrial and commercial town at the 
edge of the coffee zone, the centre of which lay farther to the west. This 
railway, similar to many lines subsequently constructed in the province, was 
built to cater for the coffee trade. Long before the first companies were floated, 
pressure was mounting for the improvement of communications in the province. 
Poor roads and the deplorable condition of tracks in the Serra do Mar where 
torrential rains frequently carried away large sections of the road bed 
occasioned repeated protests. Throughout the 1850s fazendeiros pressed for, 
and devised, various schemes to improve communications and ensure the better 
maintenance of highways and bridges. The provincial administration recognised 
that the condition of public roads was a prime concern of government given the 
great distances involved in moving rural products to ports. To this end a large 
part of the provincial budget was already allocated to road building although 
it was acknowledged that the situation could be improved. There was, too, 
concern about the haphazard nature of road building in addition to unease about 
the inadequacy of the provincial construction programme and makeshift 
maintenance provision. But, reflecting the inability of muletrains to cope with 
growing coffee output, planters were above all exercised by the lack of 
highways suitable for wheeled vehicles. To this end the franchising of turnpike 
companies was considered, the most ambitious of which envisaged a spinal 
trunk route from Santos to Rio Claro via Sao Paulo, Jundiai and Campinas with 
branches to the north and south-east.28 
The nature of these complaints, concerns and projects confirms an existing 
demand for railways. Indeed, railways franchised by the province in the late 
1860s and during the 1870s conformed to a pattern of road improvement and 
construction schemes current in the 1850s. It was, therefore, not surprising that 
by 1869 the San Paulo was handling over 40,000 metric tons of coffee and a 
total freight traffic almost twice that size. Within a year of its inauguration the 
company enjoyed a traffic density which compared favourably with that of 
longer established lines, as the table below shows: 
Freight Traffic of Select Brazilian Railway Companies 1869 
(tons/mile) 
Source: Calculated from Ministry of Agriculture, Commerce and 
Public Works Relatorio apresentado a assemblea geral legislative* na 
segunda sessao da decima-quarta legislatura (Rio de Janeiro, 1870), 
pp. 94, 95. 
That the San Paulo should handle such a volume of freight so soon after the 
opening of the line to Jundiai is testimony to the advances already made by 
coffee growing in the province and explains also the shrill protests of 
fazendeiros during the 1850s. By 1869 the other companies listed above had 
been operational for approximately ten years, having completed their original 
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sections by or before 1860. And it was the coffee trade above Jundiai that drew 
investment to other companies, firstly for the line to Campinas and later for 
railways beyond Campinas to Rio Claro and Mojy Mirim. While there was 
some dispute about the existing volume of commerce of these zones, most 
public debates which preceded the formation of new companies featured 
accounts of actual, rather than potential, traffic. By the late 1860s trade between 
Jundiai and Campinas was reckoned to be in excess of 20,000 tonnes a year, 
some 10,000 tonnes of which originated above Campinas.29 These estimates 
appear to have been reasonably accurate. Following up-country railway 
construction in the 1870s, coffee exports from Santos rose from an annual 
average of 22,300 tonnes for the triennium 1866-68 to an average of 35,400 
tonnes during 1869-71, to 35,900 tonnes in 1872-74 and to 44,300 tonnes in 
1875-77.30 
All the companies registered in the province of Sao Paulo were not 
immediately profitable, indeed some concerns became permanent liabilities on 
the provincial exchequer, giving the lie to spurious calculations about traffic 
potential and promoters' hyperbole about the security and profitability of 
investment in railway companies. Later, unprofitable lines such as the 
Companhia Sorocabana da Estrada de Ferro were to be justified upon the 
grounds of public utility rather than economic viability. Nevertheless a 
sufficient number of the original railways, specifically those constructed in the 
western coffee region, realised several objectives. These companies, as the 
above data demonstrate, served an expanding export agriculture. They yielded 
substantial dividends, a prosperity that was secured by the increase in coffee 
traffic generated by the steady extension of the agricultural frontier provoked 
by significant savings in transport costs. On the evidence of San Paulo 
operating data in 1867, it was estimated that lines in the coffee zone could 
handle traffic for less than one third of the charges levied by muleteers.31 
Aware of these possibilities, paulistas required little inducement to subscribe 
to the national plan for railways. Indeed fazendeiros had waited nervously for 
the completion of the SPR from Santos. Their anxiety to procure modern means 
of communications had been heightened by the early financial and technical 
problems which had beset the company and a sense that their province was 
being overtaken by Rio de Janeiro and the north-east, areas in which railway 
construction had been inaugurated in the 1850s. 
For the dominant agricultural and commercial oligarchy in Sao Paulo 
railways were both an economic and a commercial success. Reference to the 
grand design for national integration and vague aspirations of commercial and 
industrial progress were hardly necessary to convince paulistas of the utility of 
railways when tangible gains were already to hand. National strategy assumed 
less grandiose, more specific, objectives in Sao Paulo. Whereas the Imperial 
Government in Rio de Janeiro referred to unity and regeneration, paulistas 
observed opportunities to 'capture' the carrying trade of other provinces and 
potential for sub-regional specialisation, thereby permitting more efficient 
coffee production. Similarly, while Rio oscillated between emphases upon the 
strategic or the developmental when considering pioneer lines to the interior, 
coffee growers' prime concern was that railways should reduce transport costs, 
either as a function of technical innovation or due to railway companies' ability 
to attract state subsidies. 
De Saes has argued that investment in transport had always been regarded 
as an integral component of rural based enterprise in Sao Paulo. This contrasted 
with the position in established coffee producing zones around Rio de Janeiro 
where greater specialisation was the norm. Fazendeiros in the region around the 
capital invested almost exclusively in coffee production (that is in slaves and 
land) while merchants and muleteers financed the transport and 
commercialisation of rural commodities. Paulista planters, on the other hand, 
tended to operate their own mule trains. Hence for the fazendeiros of Sao 
Paulo, investment in railways represented little more than an innovative 
refinement of established patterns of doing business. Operating their own 
mules, Sao Paulo planters probably enjoyed a greater degree of independence 
and wielded more effective bargaining power vis a vis merchants than did their 
counterparts in Rio.32 In a similar vein Odilon Nogueira de Matos has drawn 
attention to the successful 'capture' and development of neighbouring regions 
of Minas Gerais, Parana, Mato Grosso and Goias by the Sao Paulo network.33 
Several factors account for the penetration of paulista rails into these areas. 
Construction into northern Parana and southern Minas, although barely 
accomplished by the close of the period under study, resulted from the 
inexorable spread of coffee cultivation. Topographically these zones were part 
of the coffee belt. Just as during the 1870s railways thrust into the terra roxa 
around Campinas, by the end of the 1880s railheads approached the frontier 
with Minas and around the turn of the century were poised to enter Parana. 
Lines were drawn on by the quest for new coffee lands and the knowledge that 
volume coffee freight meant railway profits. Central government subventions 
to push branch and trunk lines into neighbouring provinces were another factor 
sustaining construction. Coffee income in the 1870s and 1880s provided the 
principal logic for continued railway building during the early twentieth 
century. Moreover, once established, the pace of railway construction 
developed its own momentum, sustained by the pro-railway lobby, popular 
expectations and competition between companies and municipalities. 
In the first instance rivalry among established towns in the coffee zone and 
elsewhere sustained building. Later competition between companies and a 
desire to pre-empt other lines from entering potentially rich agricultural regions 
induced a continued, if uneven, pace of construction. As related above, long 
before the SPR opened its line to Jundiai, fazendeiros from Campinas pressed 
the company to exercise its option to extend westward. When the SPR declined, 
local coffee producers floated their own line, the Companhia Paulista da 
Estrada de Ferro, to accomplish this task and in so doing established a 
precedent for agriculturalists elsewhere in the province. Indeed, even before the 
Paulista's contractor began work on the roadbed from Jundiai to Campinas, 
residents of Rio Claro petitioned the provincial government to ensure that the 
railway would be pushed into their locality.34 Owners of coffee estates above 
Rio Claro were similarly anxious that construction should continue apace. 
When the Paulista declined to implement a guaranteed concession it held for 
this area, preferring instead to prevent the Mojiana encroaching upon what it 
regarded as more lucrative territory, residents of Araraquara and Sao Carlos do 
Pinhal sought and obtained a competitive franchise and incorporated the 
Companhia da Estrada de Ferro Rio Claro. While this move may initially have 
been intended to force the hand of the Paulista, the latter's continuing obduracy 
provoked the construction of the Rio Claro, an unguaranteed company which 
thus came to represent a natural prolongation of the CP.35 
Some towns were anxious not to be by-passed by railways, others were 
fearful that lengthy delays in the construction programme might result in a 
re-siting of commercial flows towards railheads. Yet others sought to 
consolidate further established roles as regional centres for distribution and 
trade. When the inhabitants of Itu proposed that a narrow gauge railway be 
built to Jundiai, to connect with the SPR, and declined to construct a branch 
line to Sorocaba, a long-standing rival staging post for traffic flowing to the 
south of Brazil and to the interior of the province, sorocabana protests were 
loud and influential. Deploring projects emanating from Itu, residents of 
Sorocaba floated their own company, obtained a concession for a direct line to 
the provincial capital and in due course proposed that Itu should be served by 
a branch of their own company.36 Earlier the Municipal Council of Rio Claro 
had been alarmed to learn that a scheme for a new network of roads, focused 
on the San Paulo at Jundiai, envisaged by-passing their town.37 As the 
example of the EFP demonstrated to the SPR, and of the EF Rio Claro to the 
Paulista, if existing companies declined to placate offended municipal 
sensibilities and construct branches or extensions, aggrieved towns were quite 
capable of floating local railway companies. Most fazendeiros were anxious to 
secure a direct line to Santos. Conflicting claims by coffee growers in different 
districts were thus likely to delay official sanction of railway routes or result 
in the franchising of competitive lines.38 
Conflicting claims by various localities accordingly influenced the pattern 
and momentum of construction during the decade or so after 1866; competition 
between neighbouring companies was a major influence upon provincial 
railway strategy thereafter. One was in part a function of the other. A common 
feature of railway concessions awarded at this time was an undertaking by the 
franchising authority not to sanction competing concessions for a specified 
period in a designated area - usually 30 kms - along the route to be taken by 
a company. This area, known as the zone of privilege, became almost 
immediately a matter of dispute between railways and later provoked 
controversy when branch lines were constructed. In 1871 the Companhia da 
Estrada De Ferro Ituana proposed to the Paulista that in the interests of 
economy the two lines make a joint approach to the Judiai station of the SPR. 
The broad gauge CP would lay a third rail to accommodate the metre-gauge 
Ituana.39 To the chagrin of the Paulista the CI subsequently proceeded to open 
stations in its privileged zone, syphoning traffic which the CP considered 
should have travelled by road to one of its depots. The dispute was only 
resolved when the Ituana agreed to surrender to the CP 10% of the revenue 
earned at stations located within 31 kms of the Paulista mainline.40 The 
episode reveals a lack of forethought in the framing of concessions 
(subsequently rectified). Perhaps the jealousy with which early companies 
regarded all potential traffic originating in their respective zones of privilege 
also demonstrates unease about immediate profitability. Certainly there was a 
tendency to regard these zones as absolute and to discourage a flow of 
commerce out of the designated area towards other lines. This flow was to be 
prevented not so much by a reduction in tariffs as the issue of injunctions to 
prevent other companies receiving such freight. 
Assiduous defence of zones of privilege heightened rivalries and influenced 
the pace of construction in areas regarded as natural extensions of early trunk 
routes. Immediate commercial considerations were not always uppermost when 
a company's desire to exclude competing rails dovetailed with the ambitions 
of coffee-producers in a given region to secure direct access to the broad-gauge 
line to Santos. Conflict between the Sorocabana and Ituana illustrates the 
dangers and problems inherent in the situation. At best operating on the margin 
of coffee country, the principal agricultural commodities produced in the area 
served by these lines were sugar and cotton. Neither crop encountered 
particularly favourable market conditions by the 1870s. Thus the two 
companies became locked into a zero sum game, constructing extensions in an 
attempt to secure increased traffic for unprofitable main lines and in order to 
exclude the other from what were regarded as potentially profitable districts. 
The result was long-term conflict over zones of privilege, and dispute as to the 
direction of 'natural' extensions appropriate to each line. A scramble for 
extension concessions ensued characterised by delays, route changes and a 
succession of petitions and counter petitions to the provincial government for 
franchises or the suppression of awards to the rival company.41 Confronted by 
companies pressing for licences to construct and the clamour of landowners for 
improved communications, provincial government response was often an 
ill-considered sanctioning of rival schemes. Few promoters hesitated in pressing 
ahead with such projects when concessions carried a government profit 
guarantee. Subsequently, however, provincial railway policy was criticised for 
the profligate approval of schemes that constituted a permanent burden upon 
the public purse. A related charge, well rehearsed in the provincial legislature 
and in the press, was that a lack of vigilance on the part of public officials, or 
an imperfect knowledge of details of railway operation, or indeed the 
topography of the country, had resulted in the construction of a haphazard 
railway network congenitally unprofitable and ill-suited to provincial 
requirements.42 
Notwithstanding the special pleading of regional interests, political bickering 
among different factions and the undoubted influence exerted upon provincial 
administrations by coffee growers, it would be facile to argue that unprofitable 
railway building was simply a function of a weak state apparatus unable to 
arbitrate between the competing claims of different groups. Peculiar 
circumstances apart, such as the boom in cotton prices that occurred during the 
US Civil War, paulistas recognised that only in the new coffee zone were 
railways likely to prove financially viable - a situation confirmed by the 
alacrity with which fazendeiros subscribed to lines operating in coffee counties 
in contrast to the difficulty experienced by companies operating elsewhere in 
placing shares. However, there were pressing reasons why the province aspired 
to a more extensive network and why landowners were anxious to socialise 
construction costs, shifting on to the Treasury the burden of unprofitable 
construction. By the early 1870s planters were exercised by the prospect of an 
imminent labour crisis.43 The spectre of labour scarcity crystallised in 
discussion preceding the passage of the Law of Free Birth in 1871 which, in 
declaring free all children henceforth born to slave mothers, was viewed as a 
means of circumventing mounting abolitionist pressure and stabilising labour 
supply in the countryside. The immediate origins of this crisis lay in the rapid 
expansion of coffee production in Sao Paulo, a function of the steady westward 
movement of the agricultural frontier permitted by railway construction. In the 
first instance railways eased the 'labour problem' in Sao Paulo, permitting a 
redeployment of capital and labour towards production. In the long-run, 
however, the growth of coffee cultivation in new areas made accessible by 
railways provoked an exponential growth in the demand for labour.44 At the 
heart of the situation lay the intractable problem of slavery. Effective abolition 
of trans-Atlantic slavery almost a generation earlier denied planters a traditional 
means of augmenting labour supply. Natural increase in the slave population 
was precluded by the dominance of males (who outnumbered females by a ratio 
of five to four in Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro in 1873) and harsh conditions 
prevailing. Relocating slaves from urban to rural activities and from depressed, 
drought-struck northeastern sugar provinces to Sao Paulo were but temporary 
expedients given a steady decline in the slave population. The legacy of a 
system of forced labour was manifest in the ill-treatment of immigrants which 
further frustrated a flow of free labour from abroad.45 
Central to the resolution of the 'crisis' in the labour market was a changed 
attitude to migrant workers and various assumptions regarding the role of 
railways. In these respects the impact of railways as a cost-reducing innovation 
was less significant than as a potential for regional specialisation and factor 
re-allocation within the province. It was recognised that in established coffee 
areas railways facilitated a dramatic saving in labour engaged in the transport 
of coffee. Before the construction of the EFDPII, approximately one-third of 
an estate's workforce may have been absorbed in transporting coffee to market 
at various times in the season.46 Such economies were relatively less critical 
in new coffee counties by the 1870s. Export agriculture in these zones was a 
function of rail construction per se and provoked a scarcity of labour in other 
areas. Hence it is hardly surprising that nearly contemporaneous with the 
passage in Rio de Janeiro of the Law of Free Birth came the establishment of 
immigration promotion companies in Sao Paulo. These schemes were designed 
to supplement and supercede existing arrangements by the Imperial 
Government.47 Ear-marking funds to subsidise attempts by fazendeiros to 
establish nuclear settlements for immigrants, the provincial government 
acknowledged the failure of earlier schemes to promote free migration from 
Europe to the coffee zone. Now the construction of railways in areas unsuited 
to coffee cultivation, notably in southern districts, would make land available 
to settlers who could raise food staples on small farms for the local market.48 
By reducing transport charges and the cost of setting up a business, railways 
might encourage small-scale producers to enter the market. Financing 
unprofitable railway building was thus an aspect of a larger programme aimed 
at providing the province with an effective system of transport. Endowed with 
a modern infrastructure and a progressive immigration policy, Sao Paulo would 
prove as attractive to European immigrants as the USA. A prosperous farming 
sector, yielding a surplus of basic foodstuffs, would enhance the viability of the 
coffee economy, permitting planters to specialise in the production of 
exportables, concentrating slave labour in coffee production while purchasing 
basic items in the market place. As an added bonus, viable rural colonies might 
increase rates of population growth in the province and aid the formation of a 
labour market. Such, by the mid-1870s, were the aspirations of paulista railway 
strategy, predicated upon the faculties for regional specialisation and market 
integration attributed to railways. Tangible assistance was offered to immigrants 

by the EF Paulista in 1882. The company provided free passage to coffee areas. 
Provincial legislation of 1884 and 1885 required all companies to carry 
immigrants and their effects free of charge.49 
Provincial aspirations dovetailed with national strategic considerations. Local 
interests applauded central government policy which conferred upon the EF 
Sorocabana the task of establishing trunk communications with southern Brazil 
or admitted that the Mojiana or Paulista were poised to open up the interior of 
the country.50 Aware of the long-term benefits of a large sub-national system 
focused upon Sao Paulo, fazendeiros were most appreciative of Imperial 
Government assistance to complete the provincial network in the south and to 
a lesser extent towards the north-west.51 Following initial enthusiasm and the 
flotation of several lines in rapid succession, the late 1870s witnessed a 
slackening in the pace of construction. All companies experienced difficulty in 
raising finance. For some, notably the non-coffee concerns, the problem was 
acute. By December 1874 the Sorocabana had exhausted its original capital. 
Nominal capital expenditure on the main line stood at 5.410:837$077, 
substantially above the authorised expenditure of 4.000:000$000 which carried 
a provincial 7% guarantee.52 And branch lines had not yet been completed. 
The EF Ituana was hardly in a better position. Although expenditure on the 
main line fell within the maximum to which a provincial 7% profit guarantee 
applied, the business was under-capitalised and the line poorly constructed, as 
revealed by a succession of accidents and derailments that plagued the company 
during its first months. Government inspectors required the company to 
improve locomotives and rolling stock, regrade, reblast and retrack sections of 
the permanent way and generally improve facilities.53 Remedying these 
defects entailed substantial additional capital expenditure while operating costs 
soared, due to poor construction, eroding profits and discouraging shareholders 
from subscribing to new issues. 
Given the tightness of local money markets, weaker lines pursued several 
solutions. Transfer to the state was contemplated, as was raising additional 
finance abroad. But procuring additional profit guarantee was the preferred 
solution. Indeed an extension of government guarantee cover was essential if 
further funds were to be obtained at home or abroad. Here at least was a 
correspondence of interest amongst potential national investors in railways, 
fazendeiros, the provincial administration and also the central government. 
Influenced by the precarious position of the Sorocabana and lobbied by local 
agriculturalists anxious that the company should complete branch line 
construction, the Imperial Government was compelled to support the enterprise 
and, indirectly, the hard-pressed provincial treasury. Under the terms of Decree 
5738, issued on 26th December 1874, the central government agreed to 
augment and finance the original provincial guarantee and to extend additional 
cover to complete construction of a strategic branch to Ipanema where an iron 
foundry was located. Subsequently, by a retroactive award, the province 
recognised the augmentation of guaranteed capital on the mainline and feeder 
spurs, though declined to cover the Ipanema branch.54 
All companies warmed to the prospect of central government financial 
support which, whatever its long-term objectives, might resolve immediate 
embarrassment or provide a means of securing a company's position vis a vis 
that of a rival through strategic trunk line building. Provincial railways 
responded with alacrity to a request from Rio de Janeiro for suggestions upon 
the most effective means of establishing communications with Mato Grosso, 
seeking sponorship for their respective projects.55 Interest faded when the 
Imperial Government indicated that the only financial inducements likely to be 
attached to the concession were a mileage subvention to assist construction and 
free land for the right of way.56 But, as the Mojiana later discovered, by 
constructing across the Sao Paulo provincial frontier it was still possible to 
acquire guarantees from other provinces. And, as provided by the Railway Law 
of October 1882 (the last major piece of railway legislation enacted during the 
Empire), if inter-provincial lines were deemed to be of national utility, the 
guarantee would be underwritten by the central government.57 
Yet the long-term benefits to Sao Paulo resulting from national strategy were 
substantial. The ratios of provincial to national railway miles and surface area 
were 1:5 and 1:34 respectively by the fall of the Empire. Not only was the 
province endowed with a disproportionate share of the national railway 
network, the Sao Paulo system was more effectively integrated and enjoyed 
strategic trunk communications with neighbouring provinces thanks to the 
Imperial Government's desire to open up the interior. An extensive sub-national 
system was by this stage focused on the broad-gauge line running out of Santos 
into the heart of the coffee district. Metre gauge arteries ran northward into Rio 
de Janerio and Minas, and railheads, were forging southwards to Parana and 
Santa Catarina. The realisation of ambitious projects for through rail 
communications to Rio Grande do Sul and links with Goias and Mato Grosso 
still lay many decades in the future. But this expanding system served the dual 
purpose of placing a future agricultural zone at the disposal of the city of Sao 
Paulo and, more critically, centralising coffee exports upon the port of Santos. 
There can be little doubt that inter-provincial commerce and the routing of up-
country coffee exports over paulista rails produced additional profits for 
investors in the Sao Paulo railway system. This increased volume of freight and 
the income that it generated may have reduced claims for guarantee support that 
would otherwise have fallen on the provincial treasury and could also have 
resulted in lower charges for local users. 
By the turn of the century Sao Paulo was one of the fastest growing cities in 
Brazil, its expansion promoted by coffee, the consolidation of manufacturing 
activities and its role as a regional commercial centre. In this respect the 
paulista rail network sponsored a degree of agricultural and commercial 
specialisation far greater than that anticipated in the 1870s. The coffee zone 
could now draw upon basic food supplies beyond the confines of the province. 
Research on the Paulista and Mojiana indicates that in relative terms the 
importance of coffee freight peaked during the early 1880s. Thereafter, 
notwithstanding the enormous growth of coffee traffic, other commodities 
gradually undermined the earlier primacy of exports in goods traffic.58 Those 
companies, like the Sorocabana, which had never handled large quantities of 
coffee, began to carry a range of agricultural products - foodstuffs and 
industrial raw materials - destined for the expanding urban centres of the 
planato. By the early twentieth century the state of Sao Paulo claimed to 
possess an industrial capacity second only to that of Rio de Janerio. Some 924 
industrial enterprises, employing 32,979 workers, were registered in 1909. 
These firms and the state's total population, then approaching two and 
three-quarter million, had long represented a dynamic local market provisioned 
by the railway network.59 
Crucially, railway building to, and beyond, the frontiers of the province/state 
secured the dominance of Santos as the premier coffee port in Brazil. A vital 
consideration during the period under review, it was to become an enduring 
consequence of provincial/national railway policy that the paulista network 
should continue to handle the bulk of the country's coffee trade even when 
other states began to plant coffee bushes. By establishing trunk routes into 
southern Minas and harmonising river and rail communications in the far west 
of the province during this period, and by constructing into northern Parana, the 
frontier development policy of the provincial railway industry guaranteed that 
coffee would continue to be commercialised by interests located in Sao Paulo 
and that the subsequent increase in the export tax base would benefit the 
provincial exchequer. This move enhanced the role of paulistas in national 
decision-making and in the determination of coffee policy.60 
There were also more specific, more immediate gains. Firstly, command of 
coffee traffic strengthened the financial position of paulista companies; second, 
fiscal gains accrued to the provincial administration. These positive returns 
underscored lasting benefits to be derived from imaginative strategic 
construction. While railing against the San Paulo, complaining both about that 
company's profitability and its refusal to construct further into the coffee zone, 
fazendeiros were schooled to appreciate quasi-monopoly properties enjoyed by 
public utilities and already viewed the Paulista as consolidating the hold of 
broad gauge rails upon up-country districts whether served directly or 
developed by metre gauge lines. Equally compelling were the contrasting 
fortunes of, on the one hand the Ituana and Sorocabana, and on the other the 
Mojiana and Paulista. The lesson learnt from these lines was that operating 
profits depended upon control of coffee traffic. Although coffee cargoes might 
decline in relative importance, volume growth sustained the absolute 
importance of this commodity. Moreover, other items usually paid lower 
freights than coffee and coffee represented long-haul traffic. Thus it is hardly 
surprising that after 1889 the cardinal tenets of state railway strategy were (i) 
somewhat desultory attempts to break the stranglehold of the SPR by 
constructing metre gauge access to Santos from the coffee zone, and (ii) the 
coordination of all subsequent building, not least that franchised or directly 
undertaken by the central government, in the south-west and north to ensure a 
focus upon existing trunk lines. 
Viable railways, functioning in coffee-producing zones or placed to 
commandeer traffic from up-country districts, clearly eased the guarantee 
burden borne by the province. Within four years of operation the Paulista began 
to repay previous advances received from the province in order to make up the 
difference between net earnings and the rate of profit originally guaranteed. 
Between 1870 and 1873 the CP was paid by the province a total of 
386:285$985. Repayments by the company during 1874 amounted to 
25:628$609. In 1882 this debt was extinguished with the repayment of a final 
instalment of 130:897$473.61 The Mojiana followed a similar course between 
1878 and 1886.62 With the Paulista embarked upon guarantee debt repayment, 
the province considered that the most difficult phase of promoting local 
railways was over. Observing that between 1870 and 1876 some 2,364:218$858 
had been made available to guaranteed lines, and that sanctioning further 
guaranteed concessions would compromise provincial finances, the Sao Paulo 
administration noted that indirect assistance was already available. Corporate 
earning potential was enhanced by highway improvement that secured a flow 
of traffic to stations. And the general level of economic activity in areas served 
by railways was increased by a programme of rural colonisation and 
immigration. The province also offered support to companies that needed to 
attract labour.63 With the Mojiana poised to commence guarantee repayments, 
the province wondered whether direct support was any longer necessary now 
that railway companies were of proven utility and profitability.64 
Such sanguine prognostications were premature and engendered more by the 
parlous state of provincial taxes than the likelihood of a general cessation of 
dependence on guarantee payments by all companies. While the financial 
success of some companies and guarantee repayment by others was vaunted as 
both the achievement of, and the justification for the system, it is instructive 
that by the end of the 1870s provincial administrations were much more frugal 
in sanctioning guaranteed lines. Nevertheless, the viability of companies in the 
coffee zone permitted the concentration of scarce finances upon railway 
enterprises operating elsewhere. If Sao Paulo was disinclined to finance new 
guarantees, the province was prepared to sponsor railway constructions in the 
south and south-west, ultimately assuming responsibility for the Sorocabana 
and Ituana when private initiative was exhausted. Thus the long-term viability 
of coffee lines, sustained by extra-provincial traffic, permitted in later years a 
more generous subsidy of railways functioning in other districts. In effect, a 
programme of cross-subsidisation was possible. 
Finally, there were direct fiscal gains accruing to the province from control 
of the coffee trade. During the Empire sources of revenue available to the 
provinces were limited. The most common, though of declining value given 
increased competition in world markets, was the taxation of exports. Goods 
destined for overseas markets were taxed not at the point of production but at 
the dockside. Before the 1860s the principal exports of the province had 
consisted of tobacco and sugar. Raw cotton production and exports had 
increased dramatically during the US civil war. When Brazilian cotton faced 
competition in international markets, agriculturalists clamoured successfully for 
a reduction in, and later the abolition of, provincial export duties. Thus coffee 
remained the most taxable of Sao Paulo's rural exports, by the end of the 1870s 
providing virtually the only source of income under this head.65 Although, 
with the decline in coffee prices in the following years fazendeiros also pressed 
for the removal of export taxes on coffee, the province was anxious to channel 
as much coffee traffic as possible through Santos. Before rails were laid in the 
north of the province, it was generally assumed that the focus of the 
sub-provincial economy upon Rio de Janerio was detrimental to both the region 
and the province.66 Little wonder provincial interests were appalled by the 
nationalisation of the Sao Paulo-Rio de Janerio Railway, its incorporation 
within the Central system and conversion to broad gauge, a move that was 
interpreted as a ploy to divert trade from Santos to Rio de Janerio.67 
In the main, national railway strategy complemented and furthered provincial 
aspirations, yielding for Sao Paulo by 1889 a network of communications 
attuned to the requirements of a moving coffee frontier. Connections with 
Minas and Rio were established by the fall of the Empire. If large tracts of 
territory in the west of the province were devoid of rails, a system of trunk 
lines had already penetrated the major river valleys along which railhead would 
forge into virgin territory ideally suited to coffee growing. By this stage the 
general direction of main line services to the south had also been fixed. In 
short, the provincial network was poised to emerge as a sub-national rail system 
which, despite inconvenience occasioned by breaks of gauge and diverse 
corporate management, enhanced Sao Paulo's primacy as a coffee producer 
within Brazil. Whether or not the province's coffee ascendancy was a special 
objective of central government railway policy, there can be little doubt as to 
the general gains resulting from improved means of transport nor of paulista 
pretensions in this direction. 
Provincial Perceptions of Central Government Policy 
A transient coincidence of aspirations, a degree of correspondence in terms of 
national and provincial government objectives and real practical achievement 
in Sao Paulo did not result in a harmonious relationship between paulista 
fazendeiros and Rio de Janerio. On the contrary, serious conflicts of interest 
were manifest soon after the inauguration of the San Paulo Railway and 
multiplied as pressure for additional construction mounted. Antagonism was 
fuelled by disputes over jurisdiction and the specifics of railway operation. 
Issues of jurisdiction and questions of competence were inherent in the 
formulation of early railway projects, problems that were exacerbated by 
technical and financial difficulties associated with railway building in Brazil. 
Provinces were competent to franchise and regulate entities that functioned 
within their boundaries. The central government could also award concessions 
to companies that would operate exclusively within the confines of a single 
province. Provincially franchised lines had, however, to conform with the 
general requirements of national railway legislation while all limited companies 
had first to obtain authorisation from the Council of State in Rio de Janeiro. For 
much of the period, regulations regarding limited liability were extremely 
restrictive. All railway companies - whether franchised in the province or 
functioning under the terms of a national concession - were thus required to 
submit their memoranda and articles of association to the Council for approval. 
In addition, it became the practice to send to Rio details of any railway schemes 
devised within the province. The Ministry of Agriculture, Commerce and Public 
Works was asked to comment upon various aspects of provincial railway 
concessions, not least projected, routes in order to resolve matters of 
competence and prevent competition between provincial and national schemes. 
Given the highly centralised and bureaucratised administrative apparatus of the 
Empire, this practice was hardly surprising. Indeed the very novelty of railways 
and the potential financial burden explicit in guaranteeing construction 
encouraged caution on the part of impecunious provincial administrations. 
Nevertheless, the need to seek authorisation from Rio for certain aspects of 
public works projects and institutional ossification at the centre towards the end 
of the Empire yielded ample opportunities for conflict. 
After the 1870s, in part fuelled by expanding provincial revenues associated 
with coffee prosperity, paulistas began to fret at what was regarded as 
excessive supervision of the provincial economy by Rio de Janerio. Subsumed 
in a general debate about the dangers of centralisation,68 these fears surfaced 
in protests against attempts to milk the province and in complaints at the check 
on provincial initiative represented by a lethargic imperial bureaucracy. These 
concerns were epitomised in local responses to the expropriation of the SP-RJ 
railway detailed above and in earlier accounts which contrasted the efficiency 
of that privately-owned company with the performance of the EFDPII.69 
Specifically, provincials complained at delays involved in obtaining approval 
from the central government for projects regarded as of vital local interest. 
When the number of schemes submitted to Rio had been limited, either due to 
scarcity of provincial funds or lack of familiarity with railways, friction was 
limited. As the volume of submissions grew and familiarity with project 
formulation increased, attendance upon central government decision became 
more irksome. Extension building compounded the problem. Expanding 
networks implied increasing a company's capital base which meant modifying 
memoranda of association, permission for which had again to be sought from 
the Council of State. And if a company proposed to finance new construction 
by borrowing abroad, specific sanction was necessary from the Ministry. 
Extensions sometimes brought companies into conflict with each other and 
occasioned yet another instance of reference to Rio de Janeiro.70 Months 
might pass before an answer could be obtained to even minor financial 
questions. And it was little consolation to an aggrieved company when, after 
national officials in Sao Paulo had insisted that only Rio could resolve a 
dispute, the appropriate Minister adjudged the point at issue to fall within the 
purview of the province.71 Complaints and frustrations accordingly intensified 
during the mid 1880s when a hardening of the bureaucratic arteries appears to 
have set in. Negotiations for the abrogation of the San Paulo guarantee, which 
opened in 1887 and were still unresolved at the declaration of the republic, may 
have been complex, but were not unrepresentative of the tortuous pace of 
company-central government dealings at that period. 
If companies bemoaned time taken by administrations at Rio to decide upon 
specific matters essential to medium term management strategy, and were 
apprehensive at the consequences for commercial decision-making of the need 
to refer an expanding range of questions to central government, general aspects 
of national policy disturbed a broader spectrum of the provincial oligarchy. 
Attempts by the Imperial Government to ensure a suitable geographic spread 
of railways in order both to satisfy general aspirations for national integration 
and demonstrably to placate various sectional interests were often misconstrued 
in the province. Paulista fazendeiros observed that notwithstanding early 
provision for companies in the north-east, centre and south of the country, 
railways were successfully floated in Pernambuco, Bahia and Rio de Janeiro 
while projects to construct out of Santos floundered. Contrasting approaches in 
the 1860s to the technical, and related financial, difficulties of the EFDPII and 
San Paulo Railway were also noted. The central government had subscribed a 
portion of Dom Pedro II equity capital and responded promptly to that 
company's subsequent financial embarrassment. When the market response to 
initial share placements and subsequent calls for capital had proved sluggish, 
loans had been under-written by the Imperial Government and foreign funds 
directly procured for the company. When shareholders balked at the task of 
financing construction through the coastal escarpment into the upper Paraiba 
Valley the central government responded to Rio coffee producers' clamour for 
further railway building by buying out private investors and funding extensions 
from the Exchequer. The high cost of constructing beyond the narrow coastal 
plain behind Santos, which was recognised as the critical factor inhibiting the 
incorporation of the SPR, met with little further support from the Imperial 
Government other than a willingness to guarantee 5% on an admittedly large 
capital base. 
Most early Brazilian projects carried a central government profit guarantee 
of 5%, supplemented by 2% from the provinces. By the 1850s, 7% was the 
standard guarantee for Latin American railways. This was the rate offered by 
the province of Sao Paulo on its own account after 1866, having realised as 
early as 1862 that the Imperial Government could not be expected to underwrite 
further guaranteed construction in the area.72 A view emerged that provincial 
projects were under-funded by Rio de Janeiro. Legislators complained that only 
Sao Paulo actually paid the 2% supplementary guarantee. When the provinces 
of Bahia and Pernambuco defaulted on these obligations, the central Ministry 
of Finance assumed full responsibility for the 7% due to Bahia and Pernambuco 
shareholders.73 General resentment at what was perceived as ineffective 
support for paulista lines was heightened by a parsimonious initial response 
from the Imperial Government to persistent specific pleas for assistance on 
behalf of the Sorocabana. Administrations at Rio probably guessed that Sao 
Paulo was capable of financing construction without further access to central 
funds, an assessment confirmed by the paulista railway boom during the 1870s. 
Other provinces were more deserving of direct state aid. The force with which 
these grievances were held in Sao Paulo may be questioned. Fazendeiros would 
undoubtedly have welcomed extra funds but were equivocal about the price to 
be paid for central government involvement in lines functioning in the province. 
There is evidence that the coffee sector would have appreciated direct dealings 
with the SPR and that there were efforts to exclude private Rio money from the 
project.74 Latent hostility to central authority may also be found in the 
formation of the SP-RJ railway and expressions of alarm as the EFDPII 
railhead approached and crossed the provincial frontier. 
Later, national government sponsorship of construction was viewed as far 
from costless, no matter how vociferously demands for national construction 
were enunciated or how assiduously local companies sought to bend Rio de 
Janeiro's programme of strategic trunk lines to corporate requirements. 
Paulistas wanted central government support, but on their own terms. The quest 
for national trunk line franchises was tempered by a recognition that national 
policy might hold adverse financial implications for the province. One 
company's gain could involve an extra charge upon the paulista exchequer if 
another line lost traffic and revenue. Various local interests deprecated 
ill-considered national concessions that, no matter how lucrative for an 
individual company, threatened lines holding a provincial guarantee. Potential 
for inter-government conflict which might disturb the delicate relationship 
between province and centre was inherent in any arrangement involving 
over-lapping jurisdiction. The allocation of railways concessions, however, 
threatened to disrupt more than easy intercourse between Rio de Janeiro and 
Sao Paulo or to exacerbate further inter-company relations already riven by 
controversy about zones of privilege and regions suitable for 'natural' 
extension. The scramble for central government subsidies by individual 
companies exaggerated fissures within the provincial railway lobby and 
contributed to a general re-appraisal of paulista perceptions of railway 
economics. 
Conflicts of governmental competence had emerged as early as 1870 with 
the formation of the Companhia Paulista extension concession. An option to 
construct between Campinas and Rio Claro had been granted to the San Paulo 
Railway under the terms of that company's concession with the Imperial 
Government, which provided for the line from Santos to Rio Claro to be built 
in several stages. Fazendeiros were frustrated at the slow pace of negotiations 
between the SPR and the central government and were alarmed at what was 
regarded as the government's unwillingness to exert sufficient pressure upon 
the London company to abandon its option. Therefore they obtained from the 
provincial legislature a duplicate concession for a line to Rio Claro. The delay 
in resolving this controversy was prejudicial to the interests of the Companhia 
Paulista which had already built from Jundiai to Campinas and was anxious to 
extend on to Rio Claro. Delay was also inconvenient to planters who had 
entered coffee production. The upshot was a flurry of communications and 
resolutions between Rio and Sao Paulo, each administration claiming authority 
to franchise a line out of Campinas. Ultimately, the SPR renounced its right to 
build (though after much agonising) and the Imperial Government promised to 
respect local opinions.75 
Disputes regarding conflicts of jurisdiction subsequently faded during the 
ensuing boom when the provincial administration exclusively franchised lines 
in Sao Paulo, if after due reference to Rio de Janeiro. Tension returned during 
the late 1870s, exacerbated by tightness in money markets and the very 
different conditions in the railway industry at the end of the decade. It was this 
combination of circumstances which provoked a reappraisal of provincial 
railway strategy and disturbed the prevailing consensus within the pro-railway 
lobby. Financial stringency caught many companies at a critical point in their 
respective programmes of expansion. These circumstances made provincial 
lines more responsive to national strategy and occasioned a review of the most 
appropriate methods of financing social overhead projects. Competition by 
paulista railways to secure imperial franchises again emerged as an issue 
dividing Rio and Sao Paulo, revealing sharp differences between provincial 
expectations as to the function of railways and national strategic interests. 
National programmes that undermined the profitability of provincially 
supported lines were of particular concern.76 
General discussion about future provincial railway policy commanded the 
attention of fazendeiros. The principal issue at this juncture was the setting of 
rail freights. The debate was potentially most damaging in terms of paulista 
perceptions of interference by Rio which was likely to be detrimental to 
regional economic well-being. Railway tariffs were an unending source of 
controversy dividing various groups. Resulting from an increasing 
sophistication that came with the greater maturity of the local capital market, 
fazendeiros financing railway construction as ancillary to agriculture took a 
different position on the tariff to that of shareholders who regarded railways 
largely as a field for profitable investment.77 Much discussion about railway 
financing and the nature of guarantee support for individual companies related 
directly to freight rates even if cast within the context of developmental versus 
commercial enterprises. Was the guarantee system to be employed to subsidise 
public utilities supplying low-cost services to consumers, utilities that levied 
rates which did not recover operating expenses? (This issue is addressed further 
in the following section.) It was gradually established during the 1850s and 
1860s that a return of 7% was an acceptable remuneration on railway 
investment. Profit guarantees were set at this level and if guaranteed lines were 
permitted to earn a point or two above that figure, higher profits would result 
in state intervention to reduce tariffs under the terms of a company's 
concession. Non-guaranteed lines were empowered to apply charges sufficient 
to yield 7%. A prospect of regular dividends at this level was clearly sufficient 
to attract foreign investors and was at this stage apparently enough to satisfy 
domestic capitalists. In 1873 and 1874, when the Paulista was making repeated 
calls on Rio Claro extension shares, original shareholders were receiving a real 
income of approximately 10% (only 170$00 of the 200$000 having been 
called). But as Paulista equity was changing hands at between 210$000 and 
230$000, the return on market valuation was almost exactly 7%.7K 
Consensus on acceptable levels of corporate profitability was not easily 
translatable into freights for specific commodities, certainly not during the early 
years of railway operations when the volume of potential traffic could only be 
estimated. Against this background, controversy about tariffs was inevitable. 
Perhaps it was also inevitable that planters who controlled mainly up-country 
lines authorised by the province should direct most of their antagonism towards 
the British-owned San Paulo Railway franchised by the Imperial Government. 
Odium was heaped upon the central government. Rio was accused of conniving 
at freight rates that constituted an impost upon the provincial economy. The 
centre was also castigated for failing to regulate the SPR and for being at best 
insensitive to provincial requirements. From the first there was criticism about 
the charges levied by the company. These commenced with expressions of 
outrage at the scheme devised to finance the bounty paid by Rio to Robert 
Sharpe and Sons, railway contractors, for the early completion of the 
Santos-Jundiai line. Planters applauded the inauguration of the railway ahead 
of schedule: they objected to the tariff surcharge earmarked to recover for the 
Imperial Government the cost of the contractor's bounty. Central government 
profligacy brought gain to a small clique of individuals - the contractors and 
capital city financiers who held the original SPR concession - and imposed a 
major burden upon producers.79 The company was alarmed both by the 
outrage which followed the surcharge and the possible impact upon future 
growth of traffic. The additional tariff which raised freights 30% above the 
legal maximum established in the concession represented a heavy burden for 
the industries of the province. If the contractors' bonus was to be financed by 
means of a surcharge on freight rates, the company would have preferred a 
substantially lower charge levied over a longer period. Accordingly the SPR 
reduced tariffs to force the government's hand.80 
Tariffs were an unending source of friction and it was in the interest of 
companies to blame government for delays in downward revisions of rates 
when faced with demands from irate customers for cheaper transport. As the 
volume commodity, companies were particularly loathe to reduce coffee tariffs, 
on the contrary if additional funds were needed, coffee was the first item to be 
surcharged. Issues of debentures were often secured upon ear-marked hikes in 
coffee schedules. Pressure to reduce coffee freights was usually countered by 
the retort that lower rates on coffee jeopardised extension programmes.81 This 
view was not peculiar to locally financed lines. Irrespective of whether or not 
they were owned by local or foreign capitalists, privately financed public 
utilities argued that the profitability of agriculture depended on railway 
modernisation and extension. Good dividends and buoyant share prices were 
essential to the retention of the confidence of investors and thereby ensure 
access to funds required to underwrite new construction. Nevertheless, it is 
difficult to avoid the conclusion that one of the most intense campaigns to 
reduce rail freights ever conducted in the province was frustrated by the 
Imperial Government. Substantial growth in coffee exports after the late 1870s, 
triggered and sustained by investment in railways, initiated a regular decline in 
price which by the beginning of the following decade had come to be perceived 
as both acute and permanent. Planters lobbied for official assistance and sought 
immediate relief in a reduction in rail freights which now pressed upon profit 
margins. By 1883 a general revision of freights based on differential tariffs 
declining over distance was offered by the companies as a palliative to crisis 
on the fazendas and as an alternative to across-the-board reductions. Indeed, the 
companies once again declared that a general lowering of tariffs would disrupt 
long-term extension building (upon which new coffee plantings were 
dependent). They also argued convincingly that provincial export taxes levied 
on coffee at Santos constituted as great a burden for producers as the cost of 
transport to the port from the heart of the coffee district. However, introduction 
of differential tariffs to be applied throughout the network depended upon the 
adhesion of the SPR over whose rails all coffee exports and much other traffic 
travelled. It was two years before the Imperial Government could be prevailed 
upon to accept a revised tariff for coffee and general merchandise on the 
Santos-Jundiai line.82 Only then was it possible to apply throughout the 
province integrated differential freight schedules which granted substantial 
reductions on long-haul traffic. Companies operating under provincial 
concessions, that had unilaterally applied limited reductions on sections of their 
respective networks or had abandoned surcharges, were incensed at this 
unconscionable delay, as was the San Paulo Railway which bore the brunt of 
criticism at official procrastination.83 
Unwillingness by the state to forego what was tantamount to a transit tax 
featured in the final tariff revisions implemented by the British-owned company 
at the end of the Empire. As indicated above, Rio de Janeiro was clearly 
influenced by ever increasing payments made by the SPR to the legation in 
London. The size of sums received from the company encouraged the 
government to procrastinate over guarantee abrogation negotiations (upon 
which tariff revisions in part depended), changing its position on the 
interpretation of the SPR concession and technical details regulating 
state-company relations in order to maintain a participation in the line's profits. 
Claim and counter claim were made by both protagonists and a propaganda 
campaign waged in the local press. Company and government each publicly 
maintained a commitment to reduce tariffs and to withdraw a special mileage 
supplement levied by the railway on all freight carried across the coastal 
escarpment, reforms which, it was argued, were being frustrated by the 
opposing party. In 1889, following what was in effect a unilateral abandonment 
of the guarantee, the company immediately reduced tariffs upon its own 
responsibility.84 
By the late 1880s the SPR had become alarmed at widespread complaints 
emanating from many parts of the province. Falling coffee prices and increased 
volume of production occasioned demands for lower tariffs and protests that the 
railway was unable to handle extra traffic. Critics contrasted the plight of 
fazendeiros with the large sums earned by the line and hinted at an unholy 
conspiracy between the company and the central government to share monopoly 
profits extracted from hard pressed coffee growers. Criticism and protest 
crystallised in a project to construct an alternative route from Jundiai to Santos. 
Anxious to preempt such a move, the company indicated its willingness to 
reduce freights and retorted that various long-projected solutions to accelerate 
the shipment of coffee were frustrated by the need to obtain official sanction 
for even minor works and modifications to operating schedules.85 Only by 
escaping from excessive regulation could the company hope to provide an 
effective service for consumers. 
A succession of tariff disputes during the 1880s made for an uneasy 
relationship between the companies and the dominant oligarchy. These disputes 
indicated that investment in railways was becoming more diffuse. Railway 
share ownership was no longer the exclusive preserve of coffee planters. 
Perhaps these conflicts also signalled the slow shift of capital from agriculture 
to other activities. In addition, they served to concentrate attention on the nature 
of government regulation, particularly central government intervention in 
processes of commercial decision making. Conscious of their public image, it 
is hardly surprising that the companies should seek to deflect antagonism away 
from themselves. The Imperial Government was a convenient target both for 
companies registered abroad and for lines privately financed in the province. 
There was certainly a rising tide of complaint directed at Rio de Janeiro by all 
companies in the late 1880s. This is not to say that the central government 
always opposed downward revisions of freights, or had invariably adopted a 
distant, dilatory posture in dealings with Sao Paulo. On the contrary, Rio had 
sometimes requested a lowering of tariffs and had provided meaningful 
assistance to some enterprises. Yet by the end of the period studied there is 
evidence of bureaucratic inertia at the centre, if not of incompetence. And 
specific issues affecting the railways were absorbed into the larger debate about 
centralisation and states' rights which in Sao Paulo often camouflaged crude 
demands for direct action in areas vital to dominant agricultural and 
commercial interests. Railways problems coalesced with other antagonisms 
between the province and the centre that resulted in pauiista pressure to modify 
a political system within which powerful sectional forces considered themselves 
to be under-represented. 
Financing Provincial Railways 
As has been remarked, Sao Paulo was exceptional in Latin American railway 
history on account of the large investment of local capital in the sector. What 
distinguishes Sao Paulo from other parts of the continent, and indeed the rest 
of Brazil, is not that local funds were drawn to railways per se but that direct 
private investment in the companies was provided from regionally and socially 
diverse segments of the province (though obviously largely deriving from the 
rural sector) and was sustained over time. Elsewhere, national entrepreneurial 
initiative characterised only the early phase of railway development, public 
sector and/or foreign funding became the norm thereafter.86 A plausible 
explanation of this phenomenon, and one not without some foundation, is that 
in the case of Sao Paulo government and foreign capital was unavailable 
therefore local capital was compelled to assume a direct role. But this begs the 
fundamental question, why did not the state or the foreign investor act in the 
province as in other parts of Latin America. 
The reluctance of the Imperial Government to allocate large sums to paulista 
railways has, in part, been explored above. Initially the need to make adequate 
provision for railways in several regions of the country, coupled with the view 
that local capital was available, constrained central government initiative. 
Central resources were in any case limited, particularly during the late 1860s 
and for much of the 1870s when the attention of Rio was riveted upon 
sustaining the war against Paraguay and re-establishing the country's credit 
overseas. It is noteworthy that during the period major revisions of railway 
legislation were concerned principally with the question of finance, though 
addressing also matters pertaining to regulation and strategy. The first general 
enactment, the decrees of September and October 1835, were about routes and 
operating conditions. Subsequent legislation was more specifically related to 
finance, due no doubt to the failure of any early scheme projected within the 
1835 legislative framework to proceed beyond the discussion stage. 
Students of Brazilian railway legislation declare decree 641 of 26 June 1852 
to have been a major advance upon the general conditions for the franchising 
of concessions set out in decree 100 of 31 October 1835. The principal 
differences were measures specifically designed to resolve a set of practical 
difficulties that had hitherto inhibited the incorporation and financing of railway 
enterprises. Three inducements were offered to would-be concessionaires: 
duty-free importation of material and equipment, delineation of an area within 
which no competing railways would be franchised for a pre-determined period 
and a guaranteed rate of return of 5% on capital.87 These reforms were all 
attractive to potential promoters and investors, but the conferment of a 
guarantee was, as has been argued elsewhere, of crucial importance.88 While 
this enactment did not provoke a rush for concessions, five companies were 
floated in accordance with the terms of decree 641; all except the San Paulo 
were incorporated during the 1850s. The principal defect of this innovative 
legislation was that it proposed 5% when 7% was becoming the recognised rate 
for railway guarantees. A number of provinces accordingly offered a 
supplementary guarantee of 2%. By the 1860s, 7% was the standard guarantee 
available in Brazil. Nevertheless, decree 641 did provide guarantee payments 
in sterling to companies registered abroad for up to ninety years. Yet progress 
was disappointing, the flow of private funds (domestic and foreign) into the 
railway sector was limited. The times were not propitious. If the end of the 
transatlantic slave trade and depressed prices in glutted slave markets resulting 
from large imports during the late 1840s freed funds for employment 
elsewhere, concern about the continued prosperity of agriculture induced 
caution at home. Abroad the outbreak of the Crimean War produced tightness 
in European money markets. But there were more fundamental problems, as 
revealed by a further round of reforms in the 1870s. 
Looking back from the vantage point of 1875, it was remarked how little 
progress had been accomplished in the twenty years or so following the 1852 
legislation. Less than 470 miles of track had been laid by companies operating 
under concessions issued in accordance with decree 641.89 This poor record 
contrasted with experience elsewhere in Latin America and was interpreted by 
Brazilian officials as reflecting adversely upon existing legal and financial 
arrangements. Consequently a further legislative onslaught was devised in order 
to stimulate construction. In September 1872 the Imperial Government initiated 
a process designed to facilitate provincial action. Basically a re-statement of the 
existing capacity of provinces to award concessions for companies operating 
exclusively within their jurisdiction, the process was intended to grant 
additional freedom of action to provinces by removing doubts about provincial 
competence and permitted the central government to cover provincial 
guarantees, preferably in gold or foreign currency.90 Once again the burden 
of legislative reform, encapsulated in decree 2450 of 24 September 1873, was 
the financing of railways. It was recognised that a fundamental liberalisation 
of guarantee arrangements was necessary if the 1852 decree was to fulfil initial 
expectations and draw private capital into the sector. New provisions included 
an extension of guarantees and subventions, simplified vetting processes for the 
granting and paying of guarantees and, critically, provided central government 
finance for provincial guarantees. Piecemeal amendment of 1852 guarantee 
legislation culminated in decree 6995 of 10 August 1878 which, following the 
advice of the Brazilian legation in London, fixed a special exchange rate of 27d 
per 1$000 for guarantee payments and extended the period of payment.91 The 
drift of guarantee legislation was a response to three matters of key concern to 
would-be private investors, namely (i) the rate at which profits were to be 
underwritten, (ii) the duration of guarantee payments, and (iii) - for foreign 
investors - security against exchange depreciation. In all but the final item of 
general railway legislation devised during the Empire (decree 7959 of 29 
December 1880) financial issues were paramount. Decree 7959, and companion 
decree 7960 of the same date, ordered and recapitulated various favours 
previously written into individual concessions. These final decrees established 
that henceforth all lines would be permitted to import materials and equipment 
free of duty, would receive free public land for rights of way and would be 
allowed to exploit natural resources in unexplored areas. In addition, all 
companies were obliged to maintain a legal domicile or representation in Brazil, 
were to make special provisions for the transport of immigrants and were to 
complete construction within a fixed period.92 
An enduring emphasis upon refining guarantee arrangements is perfectly 
understandable and arose from government unwillingness, or lack of ability, to 
undertake the direct financing of railways save in extremis. The early 
nationalisation of the EFDPII was clearly exceptional and that company's 
alarming appetite for funds precluded large-scale state action in other regions, 
at least until the 1880s. Committed to a major, near-continuous programme of 
extension building for the Dom Pedro II, there were no further funds to spare. 
Penury also prevented the province of Sao Paulo from investing in railways at 
this stage. Only during the latter years of the 1870s did government finances 
improve substantially, and by that stage the province was already committed to 
private construction. Both the province and the central government were 
prepared to offer tangible support to railway companies, often purchasing 
shares. But these mechanisms were applied in order to stimulate the interest of 
private capital. Hence the formulation, refinement and general application of 
profit guarantees. 
Government action to promote individual initiative was not necessarily 
successful in attracting national capital. Indeed, 1852 guarantee arrangements 
did not occasion a massive railway boom. Moreover, the peculiar nature of 
railway construction behind Santos - the technical difficulties associated with 
the project and consequent enormous sums required - initially discouraged 
paulista capital and ensured that the San Paulo concessionaires would look to 
London rather than to local capital markets. Fazendeiros were, in any case, 
already investing heavily in coffee. Hence it is not surprising that the first line 
constructed in Sao Paulo was financed by British capital. By the 1860s several 
London-registered companies were already operating in Brazil: elsewhere in 
Latin America an early local presence in the field was beginning to dim. In 
view of the early association of Rothschilds with the project and the promise 
of sterling dividends at 7%, British investment in the SPR is not difficult to 
explain. More difficult to resolve is the company's refusal to build beyond 
Jundiai, a refusal that apparently compelled fazendeiros to promote their own 
companies. As indicated above, when SPR rails approached Jundiai, a 
campaign was initiated to persuade the company to build on to Campinas and 
Rio Claro. Why did the British company not exercise its option? 
Publicly the SPR announced that it would not build from Jundiai to 
Campinas because the concession did not carry an Imperial guarantee, because 
the Paraguay war had caused a fall in Brazilian government bonds and 
depressed London Stock Exchange valuations of all enterprises connected with 
Brazil and because of the depreciation of the milreis. These circumstances 
would discourage existing shareholders from placing further funds in the line 
and would at the same time prevent the company from going to the market with 
a debenture issue. The Board of Directors' assessment of shareholders' 
reactions to demands for additional capital was undoubtedly correct and the 
company would certainly not be prevailed upon to extend without an increase 
in sterling guarantee cover underwritten by the Imperial Government. Given the 
volatility of the exchange, little faith could be placed in the paper promises of 
the province.93 But there were other reservations, expressed privately to the 
Imperial Government. The Board indicated that it could not contemplate 
extension building until various problems between company and government 
were resolved. The SPR's desire to extend, and indeed its long-term interest in 
Brazil, was confirmed by an unwillingness to surrender all extension options. 
In waiving the right to build between Jundiai and Campinas, the company 
restated its intention (given the right conditions) of laying rails on to Rio Claro. 
The company would not build in 1868, however, because of the untenable 
position in which it had been placed by the government.94 
Two interrelated disputes divided the railway and the government: formal 
acceptance of the line into public service and verification of capital 
expenditure. When construction was nearing completion, the government had 
responded to local complaints about an insufficiency of rolling stock by 
requiring the company to purchase additional locomotives and wagons, above 
the numbers stipulated in the original concession. Dispute ensued as to whether 
these purchases should be charged against current or revenue accounts.93 
Capital expenditure also exceeded the limit fixed in the concession because 
initial estimates of the cost of purchases of land and rights of way had proved 
totally unrealistic. This problem was not peculiar to Sao Paulo, being observed 
elsewhere in Brazil. Arguably, companies were unrealistic in financial 
allocations set aside for land purchases, or land owners were driven by inflated 
expectations of what foreign firms might pay for their property.96 In addition, 
the final figure was further inflated by payments of guaranteed interest out of 
capital during the period of construction. The result was an extended dispute 
between the two parties which was only resolved when the government floated 
a loan to cover part of the additional expenditure incurred by the company and 
agreed also to recognise an issue of debentures. Thus although the line was 
provisionally opened to traffic in February 1867, the capital account was not 
formally recognised until mid 1873. The company was exercised not merely by 
the delay in securing agreement. It was alarmed because the controversy had 
been preceded by a number of other disputes, the resolution of which proved 
time-consuming and appeared, to the company, to involve breaches of faith by 
Rio. During earlier negotiations with the Imperial Government, ad referendum 
agreements reached between the company's representative and officials in Sao 
Paulo, or between the railway and special agents sent to London, had been 
rejected on reference to Brazil or had been questioned by Brazil's diplomatic 
representative in London. Discussion about capital verification was punctuated 
by similar episodes. While a detailed consideration of the claims and counter 
claims of the two parties is outside the scope of this study, it is noteworthy that 
throughout the dispute the Brazilian government financed guarantee payments 
on the basis of total capital expenditure claimed by the London Board, and that 
acceptance of the line as being in good working order occurred by the end of 
1868. The company's expressions of interest in extensions, but refusal to 
implement a programme of new construction, may be interpreted as a ploy to 
pressure the government into an early resolution of the controversy about 
capital expenditure. Equally, the company was acutely embarrassed by these 
events and by the precarious position in which it felt that it had been placed by 
a lack of consideration on the part of the Imperial Government.97 
The SPR's anxiety to formalise its position in Brazil and to normalise 
relations with the government was heightened by a sequence of events that 
occurred before the opening of the line. Foreign-owned utilities were highly 
visible and all too readily became the butt of popular protest. Providing a public 
service consumed by a wide spectrum of paulista society, the San Paulo was 
subject to a series of criticisms about the cost and quality of its facilities. A 
number of incidents indicated how easily general antagonisms could be directed 
at the company and went some way towards explaining the company's 
sensitivity to demands emanating from fazendeiros and its anxiety to secure a 
clear juridical status. During construction there had been several labour disputes 
which developed into altercations between Portuguese and Brazilian workers, 
confrontations that led to loss of life and damage to company property.98 
There is evidence that some of these disputes may have been provoked or 
orchestrated by a powerful lobby of local interests connected with traditional 
transport enterprises opposed to the railway.99 In January 1871 the first fatal 
accident in the annals of railway operations in the province occurred. This led 
to the arrest, and imprisonment pending trial, of the chief officer of the SPR 
and two other senior officials who were held responsible. Although initially 
only incarcerated for three days, bail was later withdrawn and they were 
re-arrested. Suspension of service on the line, protests from London, consular 
intervention and action by Rio de Janeiro once again secured the release of 
railway officials.100 Episodes such as these arose from the novelty of the 
situation. Local officials had little or no experience of controlling public 
utilities. Often traditional governmental arrangements were unsuited to, or 
inappropriate for, the resolution of conflicts between companies and 
government. Technical and financial complexities of railway operations were 
not easily accommodated within existing bureaucratic procedures. Senior 
officers of foreign-owned utilities were usually expatriots unschooled in local 
customs, and sometimes inclined to overbearing posturing when confronted by 
petty officials. Little wonder that foreign concerns, employing large sums of 
capital and lacking effective local contacts, were anxious to secure precise, 
clearly defeasible franchises within the framework of ill-defined commercial 
codes. 
Finally, and possibly most alarming for the company, it was embroiled in 
litigation with the Barao de Maua, one of the concessionaires. Initiated on the 
eve of the inauguration of the line, the case was not terminated until 1877 but 
had reached a critical stage by 1869. The dispute involved a sum of 
approximately £300,000 advanced by the Maua Bank to Robert Sharpe, 
contractors, who had become financially embarrassed while constructing the 
line. Maua sought to recover this loan from the railway company after it had 
taken over the line from Sharpe. Throughout the controversy the SPR 
maintained firstly that it could not be held responsible for private, unsecured 
debts of the contractor to his banker and secondly that, as a company registered 
in Britain (a situation formally recognised in its franchise from the Imperial 
Government), complaints against the railway could only be pursued in London. 
Maua, however, pleaded that the case should be brought in Brazil. The 
municipal court in Sao Paulo found for Maua and declared itself competent to 
hear the case. The company protested and won in the Sao Paulo provincial 
court of appeal. Thereupon Maua placed the matter before the Supreme Court 
in Rio from where it was referred to the national Court of Appeal. At first it 
appeared that the company had a good case, the Appeal Court recognising that 
the plea should be heard in London. Early in 1870, Maua returned to the 
Supreme Court, which reversed its initial decision and declared that judgement 
might be sought in Brazilian tribunals. The company claimed that due processes 
had been overturned 'at the insistence of an influential Brazilian subject.. . ' and 
that it was being denied justice.101 These judgements bore upon the legal 
domicile of the enterprise as set out in its concession. Little wonder that the 
San Paulo was apprehensive and disinclined to commit further funds to Brazil. 
Locked into a conflict with the Imperial Government about capital 
expenditure, upon which guarantee payments would be made and future profits 
assessed, the company also found the basis of its juridical status challenged. In 
addition, the firm was subjected in Sao Paulo to what it regarded as 
manifestations of petty nationalism - assaults upon its workmen, attacks upon 
its officers and complaints about its services and operating efficiency. The early 
history of the company was thus hardly auspicious and induced a mood of 
caution if not a spirit of pessimism. Moreover, most railway companies were 
inclined to delay extension building until the traffic-earning potential of the 
initial line had been tested. Companies which had expended a substantial 
amount of capital were particularly prone to this tendency. In the case of the 
SPR this natural caution was intensified by the unique technology employed in, 
and costly working practices of, the mountain section. Assailed by paulista 
complaints, beset by Maua and in dispute with the government, the company 
required a respite and substantial operating profits before contemplating new 
works. 
Local investment in railways was not, however, simply a function of the 
negative response of government and foreign capitalists. Newspapers of the 
period and debates in the provincial legislature reveal an awareness in coffee 
planters both of the developmental properties of steam power when applied to 
transport and also of the potential for profit inherent in efficiently managed 
railways. Funds placed in railway companies could, and should, expect to earn 
the same rate of return as that available from investment in other activities.102 
By this time railways were also a known quantity. Provincial savings flowed 
into the sector after the technical problem of constructing through the coastal 
mountain range had been solved and also after a few locally financed 
companies in Rio de Janeiro had begun to declare substantial dividends. While 
the EFDPII laboured up the Paraiba valley, faced with escalating construction 
costs, the EFMaua which operated a short section of line on the coastal plain 
at the apex of a system of turnpike roads was declaring dividends of 8%.103 
Elsewhere in the province of Rio de Janeiro, contrasting with the lack-lustre 
performance of the EFDPII, modest companies also established a record of 
profitability. Indeed, by this stage state action had apparently made investment 
in the sector risk free. The Imperial Government had bailed out the EFDPII 
when that company had got into difficulties. Subsequently the state absorbed 
all equity capital, buying out private shareholders. By 1869 some 
2.400:595$944 had been paid to the Pernambuco Recife & Sao Francisco 
Railway under the guarantee and 11,201:140$000 to the Bahia Company.104 
Additional support was available from the province of Sao Paulo which also 
offered guarantees, purchased shares, provided public land, subsidised route 
surveys and generally encouraged initiative in the field of social overhead 
capital investment. 
Localism was an additional potent force making for fazendeiro sponsorship 
of railway projects. Competitive franchising of regional lines observed above, 
and recudrescent antagonism experienced by the SPR were features of paulista 
assertiveness which embraced both a desire to maximise local investment 
opportunities for provincials and a concern to exclude foreign or non-paulista 
groups. Mattoon attributes paulista interest in railway construction on the 
planalto to chauvinism and a wish to exclude from a potentially lucrative 
scheme those who were not sons of the province...'.105 A successful 
campaign was certainly mounted to remove Maua from the scene. Maua's 
projects were rejected, his concessions revoked and paulista enterprises moved 
against his bank.106 Paradoxically, local initiative may also be presented as a 
move to pre-empt further central government interference in the province, but 
this assumes that national funds were available to underwrite new projects. 
They were not. And complaints against the SPR - about lack of rolling stock, 
frequent suspension of service due to land slips exacerbated by inadequate 
construction, high tariffs, etc. - could also have induced exasperated 
fazendeiros to assume a direct role in the industry. 
Yet much of this debate places too negative a construction on paulista 
enterprise. Fazendeiros were risk-takers drawn to railways for the direct profits 
anticipated. Evidence in support of this view is provided by an emphasis upon 
corporate structures, attempts to promote relatively widespread shareholding 
and a drive to achieve managerial and technical competence in the 
administration of the principal companies. Indeed, these qualities were noted 
by foreign observers who commented too on the alacrity with which paulistas 
ventured capital in new railway enterprises.107 Not only did coffee planters 
possess surplus funds between the late 1860s and mid-1870s, they were aware 
of the volume of produce soon to be yielded by recent coffee plantings. They 
were also familiar with the difference between rail freights and the cost of 
moving agricultural commodities by traditional means. Their faith in railways 
was vindicated by the secular expansion in coffee exports and the dividends 
declared by companies such as the Companhia Paulista and the Companhia 
Mojiana. Accordingly the volume of domestic investment in these companies, 
as registered in the appendix, grew substantially. Paulista funds were drawn to 
these companies for profit. 
New investments were sustained by the expectation of earnings 
commensurate with yields in other sectors. Local funding of railways depended 
upon a transfer of coffee profits and continued investment in the sector was 
equally conditional on good dividend performance by individual companies. As 
has been stated above, paulista planters were accustomed to investing in 
transport facilities. An established stake in the transport industry not only 
encouraged Sao Paulo coffee producers to place funds in railways but also 
strengthened their position in dealings with merchants. This factor probably 
ensured that planters rather than merchants retained the larger part of new 
profits derived from savings in transport costs associated with the greater 
efficiency of railways. Before the coming of railways, transport costs 
represented between one-third and one-half the price of planalto coffee at the 
dockside in Santos. Given the relatively weaker position of the Santos coffee 
houses (in contrast to Rio merchants), planters or the railway companies 
themselves absorbed the larger part of the innovation dividend associated with 
rail transport.108 A differential of this order of magnitude also provided 
planters with a buffer against later falls in coffee prices. Thus railways, both 
as an opportunity for investment and as a device promoting planter profits, 
served as a mechanism for local accumulation. But the planter-railway 
connection was neither immutable nor uncritically adhered to, as changed 
circumstances during the 1880s revealed. 
The Cia. Paulista, for example, experienced little difficulty in raising capital 
for the main line extension from Campinas to Rio Claro during the early 1870s. 
From January 1873, the beginning of the first half-year during which the whole 
of the original line from Jundiai to Campinas was operated for a complete 
semester, until mid 1877 when the separate capital accounts that had been kept 
for each section of the company were merged, the dividend record was 
favourable, as shown in the following table: 
Companhia Paulista 
Half-yearly dividends expressed as an annual rate of return on paid-up 
capital invested in the main line section, Jundiai to Campinas 
January - June 1873 7.88% 
July - December 1873 8.75% 
January - June 1874 10.40% 
July - December 1874 10.00% 
January - June 1875 10.33% 
July - December 1875 9.90% 
January - June 1876 9.76% 
July - December 1876 9.56% 
January - June 1877 7.56% 
Compiled and calculated from Companhia Paulista, Relatdrio(s) da directoria 
da Companhia Paulista a sessao da assemblea geral (Sao Paulo, 1872-77) for 
respective half-years. 
Dividend payments of this magnitude account for the quotation above par of 
Paulista scrip. Nominally valued at 200$000, Jundiai-Campinas shares on which 
only 170$000 had been called changed hands for up to 220$000. The premium 
demonstrated the acceptance of railways (or rather this company) as a field of 
investment and underscored the favourable performance of the Paulista 
compared with alternative outlets for funds. These dividends were clearly 
higher than the guaranteed rate of profit which was set close to prevailing 
interest rates. It is equally obvious that the yield per share was very close to 
that of 'gilts'. 
All companies were not as profitable as the EF Paulista (nor as well 
managed) and the railway sector faced acute competition for domestic funds. 
By the late 1870s the early euphoria associated with railway projects began to 
fade, due partly to the weight of extension building and consequent repeated 
calls for capital, but more especially to the chicanery and malpractices which 
featured prominently in the flotation and construction of some lines and, most 
critically, to tightness in the money market. Even the Paulista was not immune 
from these adverse circumstances. Little difficulty had been experienced 
placing Campinas-Rio Claro extension shares but it later proved difficult to 
raise cash to complete the line and an additional share issue for the 
Moji-Guassu branch was poorly received. Branch line shares were not taken up 
as rapidly as earlier issues and calls answered tardily. In 1876 the company was 
paying 9% to borrow at home to finance new construction and contemplated 
going abroad for money.109 
Recourse to European money markets was about to become a general feature 
of railway promotion in the province. The Paulista floated debentures in 
London in 1878, following a precedent established by the EFSP-RJ which had 
obtained funds there in 1875 and would do so again in 1879. In 1884 the 
Mojiana sought permission from the Imperial Government to raise money in 
Britain. By 1889 most provincially registered lines had issued sterling 
debentures.110 Although, with the collapse of the exchange following the 
encilhamento, the boom period of the early years of the republic, many 
companies experienced great difficulty in servicing these obligations, the 
proportion of foreign to domestic capital remained relatively modest in most 
cases. The EFSP-RJ was exceptional in that from an early stage in the 
company's history, debentures issued in London yielded 3,574:266$889 while 
capital paid up on domestically issued shares stood at 4,082:320$000, a 
precarious balance in favour of the province.111 Raising loan capital outside 
Brazil was a rational response to domestic illiquidity. Sterling debentures could 
apparently be placed at real rates of interest a fraction above 6% when 9% had 
to be paid at home. Moreover, overseas debenture flotations did not necessarily 
constitute a dilution of local control: management was retained by Brazilian 
equity stockholders. It was unfortunate that the exchange rate, which had been 
remarkably stable following the end of the Paraguayan War in 1870 and had 
even displayed a modest rise, pushed up by coffee exports, began to slip in 
1876/7, depreciating continuously until 1885/6. The high points of the mid-
18708 were not matched again until 1888 and 1889. Thereafter, reflecting the 
'coffee crisis', exchange depreciation became an established feature of the 
Brazilian economy, a matter of concern for successive Ministers of Finance and 
mounting anxiety for businessmen whose enterprises needed to remit money 
overseas.112 By 1898 the milreis would be worth only 27% of its average 
sterling value in 1889 (see appendix). 
An alternative to foreign borrowing was domestic institutional 
accommodation or direct state participation, a lead in this direction having 
already been taken at the EFDPII. However, as explained, neither objective was 
easily realised by paulista lines. Local banks were ill prepared to provide long 
term loans. Many institutions were already over-extended by the 1870s and 
short-term accommodation was expensive.113 Intervention - other than an 
increase of guarantee cover - by the central government was unlikely and 
would probably not have been welcomed. The predicament of the EF 
Sorocabana exemplified that of weaker companies. The railway had exhausted 
its capital before completing the construction of the mainline. Sorocabana 
shareholders cast about for a saviour, at first attempting to squeeze further 
guarantees from administrations in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. When this 
failed more drastic remedies were proposed. An unfortunate line, the 
Sorocabana had early resorted to borrowing in order to make good shortfalls in 
calls unanswered by shareholders and in order to pay dividends.114 Rising 
short-term indebtedness and failure to place debentures locally encouraged the 
Board to mortgage the line to their bankers in 1874, contrary to the statutes of 
the company."^ This transaction, of benefit to the Chairman of the Board of 
Directors, hardly served the needs of hard-pressed shareholders.116 Various 
groups connected with the company took the view that the line should either be 
expropriated or granted a massive injection of state aid. Only with direct 
government participation would the region served by the company obtain an 
efficient rail service 117 Perhaps reflecting the scarcity of local private capital, 
there was at this stage, 1876, an emphasis upon the public service function of 
railways in general and of the Sorocabana in particular. It was a case of special 
pleading by interests that sought cheap transport facilities, the costs of which 
would be borne by society at large. The cash crisis of the EFS was finally 
resolved by following other companies to London. In 1877/8 £230,000 6% 
debentures were placed at 85%.118 Ever since 1872 the company had sought to 
establish links with foreign money markets, when some 50% of equities had 
ambitiously been earmarked for distribution overseas.119 
Financial stringency at this juncture profoundly modified attitudes to railway 
investment in certain quarters of fazendeiro society. Whereas earlier projects 
had been heralded as agents of progress and development, by 1876/7 
investment in rails was depicted as immobilising scarce capital. Railways 
required substantial sums of money, as demonstrated by the first enterprises 
established in the province. But the efficacy of the rail network depended upon 
an energetic programme of extension construction which necessitated repeated 
infusions of additional capital, a process that, as had been argued in 1872, drew 
funds away from agriculture.120 
Heightened by the signal failure of the Sorocabana to provide either a 
reliable transport service to consumers or profits for shareholders, these 
anxieties re-surfaced during the tariff controversies of the period which 
embraced the CP and SPR, imparting urgency to the quest for capital and cheap 
means of communications. Capital famine restricted private investment in the 
sector and was conducive to a tentative reformulation of railway strategy which 
envisaged an expanded role for government and projected the view that 
developmental construction was properly the function of the state. Challenges 
to private initiative in the industry assumed many forms: disgust at the railway 
mania which had occasioned under-funded competitive construction; fear of the 
creation of private monopolies; concern about malfeasance; criticism of the 
failure of certain enterprises to achieve basic standards of safety or comply with 
concession obligations. Expressions of unease surfaced in demands for 
government supervision, for effective transport planning and for additional state 
assistance to individual enterprises. A similar imperative under-pinned the view 
that railway promotion was as much an area of state responsibility as the 
encouragement of immigration.121 
Larger state participation was not an alternative to promoting foreign 
investment. Rather it complemented the quest for overseas funds. Provincial 
assistance was necessary in order to secure the approval of the Imperial 
Government for external stock flotations or sales to foreign consortia. 
Government supervision was essential if railways registered in London or 
elsewhere were to conform to local requirements. But raising funds abroad, or 
better still the mortgage of unprofitable lines to foreign operators, offered 
immediate relief to capital-hungry railways and coffee planters. Approximately 
40,000:000$000 (£4 million) was tied up in provincial railway companies by 
1876. An informed guess, this estimate indicates that local investment was 
twice as large as foreign. If even part of this sum was released, the benefits to 
provincial agriculture and industry would be substantial.122 Brazilian promoters 
may have assumed that foreigners would adopt a less critical approach to 
specific projects. Clearly foreign investors were content with a lower rate of 
return on capital. It was hardly remarkable, given its proven rec-
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cord and the security offered, that the Paulista was able to place £100 
redeemable 6% debentures in London at £95 - £96, or that the EFSP-RJ, whose 
provincial guarantee was under-written by the Imperial Government as per the 
terms of Decree 2450, should do likewise. What most stimulated planters' 
enthusiasm for greater access to foreign capital was the Sorocabana's success 
in placing £50 debentures at 85% in undiscriminating overseas markets. This 
was a company whose 200$000 equities had fallen as low as 30$000 and whose 
stocks normally traded on the local market at about 80$000 - 100$000.123 
During the early 1870s planters had wished to invest in railways: at the end of 
the decade it was necessary to stimulate immigration. Labour was the key to a 
further round of agricultural expansion based on the exploitation of recently 
opened territory - land brought within the margin of cultivation by the first 
wave of railway construction. A further shift in the investment cycle, favouring 
the transport sector against land and labour would not occur again until the 
middle of the following decade. 
As the graph indicates, the pace of railway expansion on the planalto, which 
had accelerated between 1872/3 and 1875/6 tailed off thereafter. The 
inauguration of newly constructed track began to decline in 1876, falling slowly 
at first until a low point was reached in 1880. By 1886 railway building, as 
measured by the completion of lines, had registered remarkable recovery and 
activity in the sector remained at a high level until the end of the Empire. 
Renewed buoyancy at this stage was characterised also by a trend towards 
re-nationalisation. The CP had retired a significant proportion of the 6% 
debentures by 1889 though the last certificates were not redeemed until 1898. 
And in 1892 the Paulista purchased from British shareholders the Rio Claro Sao 
Paulo Railway Company Limited, an independent Brazilian line running from 
the CP railhead at Rio Claro to Araraquara and Jau. Registered in Brazil and 
financed by local capital, this line was acquired in 1889 by a syndicate 
organised by the Bank of London and Rio de Janeiro.124 The Paulista had been 
negotiating the purchase of the Rio Claro line since 1888. 
With the benefit of hindsight, some modern scholarship inclines to the view 
that a quest for foreign capital in the mid-1870s and the danger of a loss of 
national control inherent in that process, given the depreciation of the exchange, 
represents a failure of paulista entrepreneurship. The procession of companies 
floating debentures in London and the unwillingness of local capitalists to 
devote further funds to the modernisation of infrastructure appears to lend 
credence to a school of analysis which argues that planters were narrowly 
interested in acquiring land and had little perception of economic opportunities 
beyond coffee. Starter investment by agriculturalists is depicted as ancillary to 
plantation production and as a ploy to trigger state or foreign interest in 
subsequent railway building. The events of the 1870s do not bear such a 
construction. Paulista capitalists attempted to secure funds abroad because at 
that time short-term domestic borrowing was expensive and long-term foreign 
accommodation relatively cheap. Placing debentures in London was a means 
of obtaining relatively inexpensive funds without surrendering domestic 
management (provided mortgage capital was regularly serviced). In retrospect, 
the wisdom of these moves, and the assumptions upon which they were based, 
may be questioned. At the time fazendeiros behaved as rational capitalists, 
responding to that peculiar conjuncture of high interest rates at home and a 
stable exchange. When the exchange rate softened and the milreis fell against 
sterling, the response was to seek additional state support from the Imperial 
Government which by Decree 2450 of 1873 was empowered to underwrite 
companies already in receipt of provincial guarantees and later, when the 
exchange hardened, to recapture lost ground. 
Accounts of the period present the decade or so following 1876 as a time of 
acute labour shortage.125 Rigidity of labour supply was not peculiar to the 
1870s, rather planters displayed a heightened awareness of the problem. Indeed, 
the perceived scarcity of labour was a function of the spread of railways across 
the planalto after 1872 which propelled the cultivation of coffee into the centre 
of the province and beyond. These years, when the milreis fell, also witnessed 
increased industrial activity in Sao Paulo. Manufacturing output grew, 
presenting additional outlets for domestic funds. Recent historiography supports 
contemporary opinion that stressed new openings for industrial investment in 
the 1870s.126 Consequently it is hardly surprising that paulista interest in 
railways faded. Restructuring investment portfolios, dynamic coffee capitalists 
responded to new market opportunities and also to the acute crisis in 
agriculture.127 If after the mid-1860s it was necessary to fund railways in 
order to bring new land into cultivation, it was now essential to finance 
schemes to secure adequate labour or opportune to pursue new avenues of 
investment in manufacturing triggered by modest demand for agricultural 
equipment and the growth of the local market. If during the early 1870s 
railways offered a profitable opening for investment that was ancillary, or 
possibly for some an alternative, to land, by the 1880s improved transport 
facilities and increased domestic purchasing power yielded additional outlets 
for capital. 
How much capital did local investors place in paulista railway companies 
and what was the relative significance of that investment? As will have become 
clear from the narrative above, local investment grew substantially after 1869 
following the flotation of the Companhia Paulista. Foreign participation in the 
sector assumed two forms. First, British shareholders invested directly in the 
San Paulo Railway. Recognised investment in the SPR changed little during the 
period under consideration. Second, locally-owned companies raised loans in 

London during the latter half of the 1870s. In addition, the SPR was 
encumbered with a small volume of debenture stock also issued in Britain, 
while two small lines were transferred to British ownership at the end of 
Empire. 
As the table on page 50 demonstrates, foreign (British) capital dominated at 
the outset. In 1866, the San Paulo accounted for the totality of investment in the 
sector and about 12% of nominal British investment in Brazil. Almost a decade 
later, following the flotation of the Paulista, Mojiana, Ituana and Sorocabana 
and before those companies placed debentures in London, domestic and foreign 
funds were about equal, with a ratio of 1:1.05. Between 1875 and 1880, local 
investment increased at a much faster rate than the growth in external financing 
(by 44% compared to 14%) yielding a ratio of 1:0.87. At the end of the period, 
domestic funding predominated, with a ratio of 1:0.73 or a figure equal to about 
20% of the foreign debt. This signalled a significant allocation of provincial 
capital. To place railway investment more firmly within a local context, Zelia 
Cardoso de Mello has calculated that between 1870 and 1895 investments in 
shares, largely railway company scrips, represented from 2% to 39% of the 
individual wealth of an admittedly small sample of paulista capitalists.128 
Coffee Planters, the State and Foreign Capital 
An analysis of the precepts and perceptions underlying paulista railway 
development and the determinants of Brazilian national transport strategy 
contributes to an understanding of the relationship between the coffee sector 
and government. The struggle to promote railways and to ensure a local 
presence in the field prefigures current debates about the alliance between the 
state, multinational corporations and domestic capital in manufacturing. During 
the period studied, Brazil experienced remarkable economic expansion which 
was accomplished at a time of relative political stability. The essential 
characteristics of the political arrangements of the Second Reign have been well 
rehearsed, as have the structural and sectional tensions which ultimately 
resulted from the spread of coffee cultivation on the planalto. In essence those 
tensions are reflected in the course of Sao Paulo railway history. 
The alacrity with which paulista capitalists embraced railway projects 
indicates a substantial degree of entrepreneurial initiative and access to funds. 
The capitalist character of coffee cultivation (at least in the more dynamic areas 
of the province) is not in doubt. Of greater interest to students of political 
economy are the means employed to modernise the infrastructure rather than 
the nature of funding per se. Recognising both financial and technical 
handicaps which inhibited local participation in schemes to construct in the 
serra, paulistas enlisted the aid of central government and foreign capital. An 
active, anxious state in Rio de Janeiro was determined to pursue various 
projects designed to secure order and to promote economic expansion. Cautious 
foreign investors would not act without official support and, moreover, required 
some local participation as a token of good faith and as confirmation of the 
feasibility and profitability of technically complex projects. Imperial 
Government intervention in early provincial railways was probably inevitable; 
it was essential if funds were to be procured overseas and as such was 
welcomed by provincial vested interests. Indeed, it is doubtful if the line from 
Santos to Jundiai could have been built without direct and sustained support 
from Rio de Janeiro. Only gold guarantees underwritten by the Imperial 
Government carried conviction in foreign money markets: only the central 
government enjoyed established links with foreign financiers. As the superior 
power, it was at the time assumed that the central administration was most 
competent to franchise novel schemes such as costly public utilities, especially 
when a substantial foreign presence in the sector was envisaged. 
Thus at the outset central government involvement and external participation 
were accepted as inevitable. It may also have been assumed that the one would 
balance the other. Certainly during the 1860s the Imperial Government was 
depicted as performing a supervisory role. Consensus proved more difficult to 
secure thereafter. The initial enthusiasm which greeted schemes to build beyond 
Jundiai, as evidenced by subscription meetings held at Campinas, Itu, Sorocaba 
and other up-country centres, indicates a positive provincial commitment to 
financing railways and a perception of local competence. Subsequent petitions 
to the Sao Paulo government for new concessions and extension building by 
established companies confirms that provincials saw profit in railway 
construction and operation. This continued enthusiasm for new investment 
opportunities in corporate structures does not permit an interpretation which 
argues that fazendeiro funding of railways was essentially passive - a response 
to a refusal by foreign capital and the state to act - or a transient phenomenon. 
Local capitalists actively invested in the field and, in some circumstances, 
attempted to exclude outsiders. Maua's exit was the product of several factors, 
not least provincial opposition to a number of his projects. The removal of 
Maua signalled also a new attitude to central government interference in 
provincial lines. As has been stated, financial assistance from Rio de Janeiro 
was invariably applauded, usually there was a clamour for Imperial gold. 
Supervision by the central government, however, proved irksome, and 
increasingly so with the passage of time. 
In command of the Sao Paulo administration and under-represented at 
national level, fazendeiros considered that the provincial government was the 
most appropriate authority to regulate public utilities and franchise companies. 
Subsidies from Rio de Janeiro were welcomed, but provincial interests wished 
to exercise the prerogative of determining routes. The railway decree of 1873 
which provided central government-funded guarantees for provincially 
authorised enterprises went some way to meeting these aspirations. An equally 
contentious area of railway regulation was tariff policy. Brazilian legislation 
provided for state regulation of rail freights. Various situations applied at 
different periods, but government was usually empowered to act when profits 
exceeded a specified level or occasionally when profits rose above 'acceptable' 
limits. Guarantee arrangements afforded an even more direct method of 
corporate regulation. Guarantee payments may have represented a substantial 
charge upon the Exchequer, but the device provided for government scrutiny 
of construction and operating costs and also served as a vehicle for bureaucratic 
training. Reports of railway fiscal engineers (government inspectors) during the 
period indicate that a considerable degree of government supervision was 
exercised. These reports usually provided the evidence deployed by fazendeiros 
in campaigns for rate regulation. Scrutiny and tariff fixing lay with the 
franchising authority. Thus local supervision of railways would be enhanced by 
the awarding of provincial concessions. Less direct control was implicit in a 
regime of centrally franchised lines. 
The determination of routes and tariffs were obvious areas of conflict 
between the province and the centre. Early criticisms of San Paulo freight rates 
rebounded to the discredit of the Imperial Government, as did that company's 
propaganda campaigns to placate local opposition. Subsequent annoyance at the 
need to refer projects to Rio de Janeiro for approval, and provincial petulance 
at limited disbursements by central government for railway guarantees, 
provoked further irritation. Provincial antagonisms crystallised in complaints 
about bureaucratic inertia and incompetence at the capital and in the charge that 
an over-centralised political structure was stifling local initiative. By the 1870s, 
for many fazendeiros the dead hand of Rio de Janeiro was most obvious in the 
area of transport policy. Railways were by then an established feature of the 
provincial economy and the performance of the sector was regarded as essential 
to the well-being of agriculture. In this respect, disputes over railway policy 
were an important factor in that campaign for greater local economic and 
administrative autonomy which formed the background to the fall of the Empire 
in 1889. 
Ambivalence was characteristic, too, of the relationship between local and 
external capital in the railway industry. Although by no means absent, state 
capital was less a feature of the industry in the province at this juncture than in 
other parts of Brazil or in the manufacturing sector during the late twentieth 
century drive to industrialise. An area of early corporate activity involving 
substantial amounts of finance provided from both domestic and foreign 
sources, paulista approaches to overseas companies and an absorption of 
imported expertise in the sector illuminate later discussion about the role of 
multinational corporations in Brazil. As indicated, external funds and 
technology were ascribed a specific role, as was the state. 
Recognising that a shortage of funds and expertise, and possibly managerial 
skills, had frustrated pre-1860s schemes to construct through the coastal 
escarpment, planters accepted and acknowledged the critical importance of a 
British presence in the railway industry. And the construction of the San Paulo 
provided an opportunity for acquiring and disseminating appropriate skills 
throughout the provincial railway industry. Whether or not envisaged at the 
outset, sub-contractors employed to construct the roadbed of the London-
registered line later moved on to build railways on the planalto. British 
engineers associated with the SPR were consulted about projects to push lines 
into the interior. The despatch to Brazil of experts and mechanics by the San 
Paulo served as a model of overseas recruitment for paulista companies. 
Consequently an initial direct foreign presence in the field was assumed to be 
desirable and was perhaps inevitable. Railway building and operations in the 
interior posed fewer technical and financial problems. Pre-railway schemes to 
improve roads in the planalto, and provincial expenditure on road building and 
maintenance, demonstrate that funds were available and point to the healthy 
state of civil engineering. Starter foreign investment was thus encouraged, but 
an enlarged external presence in the industry was not. If foreign capital 
continued to be sought by paulista railways during the 1870s and 1880s and 
foreign experts and technology imported, it was to serve locally managed 
entities. Notwithstanding abortive schemes to sell the EFS to foreign interests, 
and dangers implicit in an excessive and increasing reliance upon foreign 
mortgage funds, it is instructive that between the completion of the SPR 
mainline and the sale of the Rio Claro, a foreign presence in the sector was 
confined to the level of loan capital. 
Perhaps mid-nineteenth century coffee planters were more successful than 
later generations in domesticising enterprise because the technology gap was 
less acute in railways than in other sectors. More probably the SPR presented 
a pressing example of the cost of reliance upon externally controlled entities. 
That the dividends declared upon equity stock by the Paulista during the 1870s 
and 1880s matched those paid by the San Paulo reflects both upon the 
perspicacity and the enterprise o f f a zende i ro society. High dividends, sustained 
over several decades, demonstrate too that railways were an important 
mechanism for profit retention and capital accumulation. The early 
preponderance of coffee planters among railway shareholders confirms not only 
their affluence but points also to their dominant position within the agro-export 
complex. The subsequent relative dilution of fazendeiro investment in railway 
companies points both to the mobility of planter capital and to the growing 
complexity of the local capital markets. Coffee planters were endowed with a 
realistic assessment of their capacity to fund major social overhead projects and 
of the government's ability or willingness to defend local interests in disputes 
with foreign firms. Certainly the Imperial Government, in its dealings with the 
SPR, was often depicted as ignoring provincial interests. Perceived 
shortcomings in the performance of central government and widening 
opportunities for profitable investment fuelled the quest for direct control over 
the state apparatus and for a larger role in the local economy. 
APPENDIX 
Several problems are encountered when seeking to calculate, and to determine 
the origin of, capital invested in Sao Paulo railway companies. Where possible 
an attempt has been made to construct tables on the basis of real investment 
recognised by the provincial government. When this information is not 
available, corporate statements of paid-up capital or declared results of share 
calls have been employed. Converting milreis into sterling has been 
complicated by exchange rate instability. Although the lowest rate for the 
milreis was recorded in 1885 (1$000 = 17 5/8d), the Brazilian currency was 
weak against sterling during the late 1860s and early 1870s. But the milreis 
appreciated during the mid-1870s, touching a high point of 28 3/8d in 1875, 
and also recovered during the late 1880s when, in 1889, the average rate for the 
year stood at 26 7/16d. In addition, sharp fluctuations were registered during 
the course of every year. Conversion has been effected on the basis of annual 
average rates of exchange and not the notional rate of 27d which became the 
semi-official rate for 'fiscalising' (i.e. inspecting) the accounts of foreign 
enterprises. Total sterling equivalents of a company's capital account have been 
computed by converting new investment into sterling at the prevailing annual 
average rate of exchange, this sum being added to the previous sterling base. 
Such a course has been followed where complete - or near complete - sets of 
data exist. In all other cases individual calculations have been made for the 
years that data are available. 
Quantitative and qualitative evidence suggests that virtually all funds 
invested in provincially registered railways were raised in Sao Paulo. 
Shareholders lists are dominated by paulistas. Only occasionally is there 
reference to stock holdings by Brazilians from other provinces of the Empire 
and most were described as long-term residents of Sao Paulo. Corroboration of 
the local character of investment is provided by the unsuccessful attempts of 
some enterprises to place equity stock in Rio de Janeiro. Most lines also 
obtained accommodation with local banks, though the Sorocabana floated loans 
in the national capital. The principal flow of non-paulista Brazilian funds into 
provincial railway companies was directed towards entities registered abroad. 
But the San Paulo was probably exceptional in the volume of extra-provincial 
capital that it attracted. The vast majority of funds - debentures and direct 
investments - drawn to paulista railways from outside the Empire emanated 
from London. Foreign investment has been calculated on the basis of real 
capital transfers to Brazil; commissions and discounts have been deducted from 
stock flotations overseas. 
Notwithstanding difficulties in determining real (as opposed to nominal) 
investment and in calculating an approximate rate of exchange in order to 
convert milreis accounts into sterling, the most intractable problems arise from 
the incomplete nature of, or obvious inconsistencies in, the data. Difficulties 
emerge from the tendency of different reporting agencies to record distinct 
series of statistics. Some bodies compiled data by fiscal year, others by 
calendar year. Occasionally reference was made to authorised rather than to 
actual investment. The documents are not always unambiguous about these 
matters. Gaps in the data are compounded by mistakes which resulted when 
transcribing information from one series or agency to another. Large 
differences sometimes occur in statistics reproduced in official provincial 
reports, on the one hand, and yearbooks published by the central government, 
on the other. Such errors appear in statements which purport to emanate from 
the same source. 
Other difficulties are presented by contemporary accounting practices and 
differing conventions applied from company to company. Although 
amalgamations were rare during the period, several railways maintained 
separate capital accounts for main and branch lines or for different sections of 
the network that were franchised at different periods. Towards the end of the 
1870s a number of entities unified these separate capital accounts. The usual 
method of obtaining unified accounts was by means of a distribution of new 
scrip amongst the several historic categories of stockholders. New scrip was 
allocated on the basis of the previous earnings of stocks to be retired, not upon 
the basis of real investment. For example, when the Companhia Paulista unified 
three sets of accounts in 1877, holders of ex-mainline shares received an 
allotment of new stocks equal to the face value of their old shares, only 85% 
of which had been called. Indeed, original shareholders received an additional 
distribution of scrip on account of the better dividend record of the mainline 
compared with branch line paper. Sometimes the details of these arrangements 
survive and the resultant writing up of capital accounts may be discounted; 
often, however insufficient information is available. 
Malpractice is not unknown in the annals of paulista railway history: some 
capital accounts contained a great deal of 'water'. The most notorious case was 
that of the Sorocabana whose first chairman behaved most improperly. He 
appears to have appropriated funds raised to build the line for his own purposes 
and illegally issued company paper as security against private ventures. In this 
instance government inspectors identified discrepancies in the railway's official 
returns and wrote down recognised capital. But were public servants always 
sufficiently alert? Furthermore, a number of lines, such as the Ituana, were 
poorly constructed and later additions to capital account should properly have 
been charged against depreciation. Such tendencies inevitably inflate the 
volume of domestic investment in railways. Problems of a different nature are 
presented by schemes to finance construction from revenue or convert floating 
debt into equity capital. The terms of these arrangements are not always set out 
in available documents and reports. Failure to record these transactions 
obviously results in an under-estimation of domestic financing. 
Inspite of these defects and deficiencies, the following tables remain a 
reasonable guide to the weight of paulista capital tied up in the local railway 
industry and demonstrate also the balance between domestic and foreign 
finance. The figures indicate the scale of Brazilian initiative in absolute terms 
and provide an insight into the capacity of the provincial economy to sustain 
a flow of funds for social overhead projects. 
Annual Average Exchange Rates 
(pence per milreis) 
d P 
1869 18 13/16 7.83 
1870 22 1/16 9.19 
1871 24 1/32 10.01 
1872 25 10.40 
1873 26 3/32 10.87 
1874 25 25/32 10.74 
1875 27 7/32 11.33 
1876 25 11/32 10.55 
1877 24 9/16 10.23 
1878 22 15/16 9.55 
1879 21 3/8 8.94 
1880 22 3/32 9.20 
1881 21 29/32 9.12 
1882 21 5/32 8.81 
1883 21 9/16 8.98 
1884 20 11/16 8.61 
1885 18 19/32 7.74 
1886 18 11/16 7.78 
1887 22 7/16 9.34 
1888 25 1/4 10.52 
1889 26 7/16 11.01 
Source: Calculated from J F Normano, Brazil: a study of 




















Source: Ministerio de Agricultura, Commercio e Obras Publicas, Relatorio 
apresentado a assembled geral na segunda sessao da vigesima legislatura (Rio de 
Janeiro, 1887), p. 305. 
* No further capital raised during the Empire. 
Note: The company did not raise any capital outside Brazil. At the end of the 
century the line was purchased by the San Paulo (Brazilian) Railway Company 
Limited. 
* Capital Expenditure (local currency) 
Main Line Branches Total 
1871 937:820$ 937:820$ 
1872 
July 1873 2.542:389$ 1.068:146$ 3.610:535$ 
1874 
June 1875 3.014:172$ 2.507:642$ 5.521:814$ 
Dec 1876 3.366:026$ 3.428:944$ 6.794:970$ 
1877 
June 1878 3.359:185$ 5.223:991$ 8.583:176$ 
June 1879 3.411:921$ 4.253:191$ 7.655:112$ 




June 1883 3.916:684$ 4.365:644$ 8.282:328$ 
1884 
Dec 1885 4.345:871$ 4.845:799$ 9.191:670$ 
Source: Companhia Ituana, Relatorio da directoria da Companhia Ituana 
apresentado a assemblea geral de accionistas em sessao de 7 de Janeiro de 1872 
(hereafter Relatorio ...) (Itu 1872) p. 5; Relatorio ... 3 de agosto de 1873 (Sao 
Paulo, 1873), Annexos 1 & 4; Relatorio ... 21 de novembro de 1875 (Sao Paulo, 
1880), Annexos 3 & 5; Relatorio ... 3 de setembro de 1876 (Sao Paulo, 1880), 
Annexo 2; Relatorio ... 29 de abril de 1877 (Sao Paulo, 1879), Annexos 2 & 3; 
Relatorio ... 10 de novembro de 1878 (Sao Paulo, 1878), Annexos 2 & 3; Relatorio 
... 12 de octubro de 1879 (Sao Paulo, 1879), Annexos 3 & 5; Relatorio ... 28 marqo 
de 1880 (Sao Paulo, 1880), Annexos 3 & 5; Relatorio ... de 16 de setembro 1883 
(Sao Paulo, 1883), Annexos 3 & 5; Relatorio ... 4 de abril de 1886 (Sao Paulo, 
1886), Annexos 7, 8, 9. 
* Includes stock distributed to shareholders in lieu of dividends. 
•Capital Expenditure (Sterling equivalent) 
Main Line Branches Total +Capital 
Issued 
Abroad 
1871 £93,875.78 £93,875.78 
1872 
Jul 1873 264,601.04 116,107.47 380,708.51 
1874 
June 1875 316,662.38 274,955.85 591,618.23 
Dec 1876 354,117.34 375,746.28 729,863.62 
1877 
June 1878 353,440.77 553,276.42 906,717.15 
June 1879 358,316.21 463,525.96 821,842.17 




June 1883 403,565.24 473,626.58 877,191.82 
1884 




Source: See Table 3A. 
* Includes stock distributed to shareholders in lieu 
of dividends. 
+ Nominal value of debentures placed in London. 
Recognised Capital + Capital 
(Main Line) Issued Abroad 
Local Sterling 
currency equivalent 
1870/1 110:290$000 £10,587.84 
1871/2 1.342:240$000 136,369.93 
1872/3 1.748:600$000 179,606.63 
1873/4 1.873:500$000 193,102.07 
1874/5 1.957:895$906 202,415.05 
1875/6 1.997:364$466 206,732.95 
1876/7 
1877/8 2.052:695$206 212,329.91 
1878/9 2.023:185$136 209,267.92 
1879/80 2.043:256$692 211,088.35 
1880/1 2.043:386$232 211,100.25 
1881/2 2.043:420$922 211,103.29 
1882/3 
1883/4 2.047:596$692 211,472.65 




Source: Ministerio de Agriculture, Commercio e Obras Publicas, Relatorio 
apresentado a assembled geral legislativa na segunda sessao da vigesima 
legislatura (Rio de Janeiro, 1887), p. 304. 
+ Dentures issued in London 
Total Capital Expenditure +Balance of Sums 
Local Sterling Raised Abroad 
currency equivalent 
1870 * 1.316:528$ £120,988.73 
1871 
1872 4.161:159$ 433,176.65 
1873 4.202:197$ 437,637.48 
1874 5.918:535$ 621,972.18 
1875 8.310:396$ 892,970.03 
1876 10.242:720$ 1,096,830.20 
1877 12.723:420$ 1,350,605.80 
1878 13.704:965$ 1,444,343.30 £150,000.00 
1879 14.420:199$ 1,511,575.20 148,500.00 
1880 15.159:043$ 1,579,548.80 146,900.00 
1881 15.722:870$ 1,630,969.80 145,200.00 
1882 16.121:116$ 1,663,227.70 143,400.00 
1883 16.504:104$ 1,697,620.00 141,500.00 
1884 16.221:804$ 1,673,314.00 139,400.00 
1885 16.660:905$ 1,707,300.40 137,100.00 
1886 16.151:864$ 1,667,697.10 134,600.00 
1887 17.538:233$ 1,797,183.90 131,900.00 
1888 18.022:200$ 1,848,097.20 129,000.00 
1889 18.446:245$ 1,894,783.50 125,900.00 
1890 19.487:116$ 1,992,626.30 122,600.00 
Source: Arquivo de Estado de Sao Paulo, Ordem 942/Lata 147 (Oficios Diversos: 
Capital, Estradas de Ferro, 1871); Companhia Paulista, Relatorio de directoria da 
Companhia Paulista de Estradas de Ferro para a assemblea geral ordinario de 28 
de abril de 1941 (Sao Paulo, 1941), Annexo. 
* Paid up capital 
+ The figures that appear in this column represent the unredeemed balance of 
debentures issued in London. 
Total Paid Up Equity Debentures Issued 
and Loan Capital Abroad 
Local Sterling 
currency equivalent 
1873 756:850$ £82,269.60 
1874 1.350:000$ 145,973.90 
1875 3.000:000$ 332,918.90 
1876 -
1877 -
1878 4.700:000$ 495,268.90 
1879 5.000:000$ 522,088.90 
1880 5.071:200$ 528,639.30 







1888 11.225:476$ 1,175,665.90 £483,700.00 
1889 12.850:137$ 1,354,541.00 
1890 20.991:456$ 2,119,824.90 
Source: Companhia Mojiana, 1872-1922: centenario do Brazil, cincuentario da 










+ 1886 3.000:000$000 £280.200 
1887 
1888 
* 1889 6.606:000$000 600.000 
Sources: Sao Paulo, Relatorio Apresentado a Assemblea Legislativa Provincial de 
Sao Paulo pelo Presidente de Provincia Barao do Parnahyba no dia 17 de Janeiro 
de 1887 (Sao Paulo, 1887), p. 84; R. Graham, Britain and the Onset of 
Modernization in Brazil (Cambridge, 1968), p. 60. 
+ Capital placed entirely in Brazil 
* The Company was sold to a British consortium by the Brazilian shareholders. 
San Paulo (Brazilian) Railway Company Limited 
* Recognised Capital 
1861 


























Source: Compiled from various issues, San Paulo (Brazilian) Railway Company 
Limited, Annual Report(s) and Statement(s) of Accounts. 
* Includes interest payments to shareholders during period of construction and 
approximately £300,000 loaned by Maua Bank. 
+ Includes loan of £100,000 raised by the Imperial Government, 
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